Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean

Abstract

This article analyses the search and rescue (SAR) activities carried out by three NGOs (MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch) in the Central Mediterranean, and asks whether and in how far nongovernmental SAR contributes to the repoliticization of the EU maritime border. The article first introduces the concept of depoliticization/repoliticization, as well as that of humanitarianization. Two sections summarize the development of the SAR regime and the governmentalization of international waters in the Strait of Sicily from the Cap Anamur case to 2016, and from late 2016 to recent days. Against this backdrop, the article analyses the different political positions taken by MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch, their operational activities, as well as their cooperation and relations with the other actors involved in SAR. The three NGOs react differently to the contradictions that are typical of humanitarian non-state action. MOAS keeps a neutral political profile, whereas MSF and Sea-Watch regard their SAR activities as part of a political, not only humanitarian commitment. While the convergence of delocalized state sovereignty and humanitarian reason leaves hardly any room for manoeuvre, MSF and Sea-Watch try to question and contrast governmental policies and practices, as well as to turn international waters into a political stage from which they can make their voice heard and on which they can play the watchdog role.

Migrant rescue as organized hypocrisy: EU maritime missions offshore Libya between humanitarianism and border control

“…Although most of the vessels used by both missions are not primarily designed for maritime rescue, they are nevertheless large, fast ships that can rely on air support and are manned by large crews of professional sailors. Still, the two missions together saved a smaller number of migrants than did NGOs, usually relying on volunteers operating from small, slow reconverted fishing ships (Cusumano, 2017a(Cusumano, , 2017cCuttitta, 2017). Triton's and EUNAVFOR's contribution to SAR also appears relatively modest when compared with a naval military mission such as Mare Nostrum.…”

“…Most notably, the increasing presence of NGO ships offshore Libya relieved EU assets of part of the burden of rescuing missions (Cusumano, 2017a(Cusumano, , 2017cCuttitta, 2017). Triton's limited role in SAR, however, was also shaped by operational choices.…”

“…However, private vessels may be reluctant to comply with this duty, which could entail additional costs or trigger prosecution for abetting illegal immigration (Basaran, 2015;Cuttitta, 2017;Moreno-Lax, 2017). Political disincentives against the involvement of the military and border police vessels of EU MSs also exist.…”

Military-humanitarianism

“…While the mobilization of non-state actors to support refugees fleeing by sea dates back to the late 1970s with the Vietnamese boatpeople crisis, and continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s-most prominently with the German Cap Anamur missions-the 2014 mobilization in the Mediterranean Sea was unprecedented in terms of forces deployed. In this context NGOs 2 , independent actors 3 , and philanthropists 4 in fact, enlisted their own fleets and deployed their means to detect boats in distress and assist with rescue operations (Cusmano 2017, Cuttitta 2017, Stierl 2017). An under-estimate of the lives rescued through these activities speaks of about 84,300 people (Zandonini 2017).…”

“…Hence, what is left of humanitarianism? Humanitarian interventions get split from a politics of protection, which are apt to bring migrants to safety, and recognizing them as refugees (Cuttitta, 2017;Sciurba, Furri 2017): humanitarianism is relegated to a biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown, which consists of simply fishing out (or not) migrants from the sea. This would mean in fact corroborating the image of a "good humanitarianism", free of articulations/entanglements with security and military modes of intervention.…”