2010
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1539548
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Repo Market Effects of the Term Securities Lending Facility

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…As the first to investigate the information value of the stress test, our paper extends the growing literature on the rationale and efficacy of various government efforts to contain the financial panic (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2009;Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009;Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu 2010). We also add new evidence to the debate over bank opacity (Morgan 2002, Flannery et al 2004) and the related literature on the information value of government bank examinations (Berger, Davies, and Flannery 2000;Flannery and Houston 1999;Berger and Davies 1998;Gunther and Moore 2003).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 68%
“…As the first to investigate the information value of the stress test, our paper extends the growing literature on the rationale and efficacy of various government efforts to contain the financial panic (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2009;Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009;Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu 2010). We also add new evidence to the debate over bank opacity (Morgan 2002, Flannery et al 2004) and the related literature on the information value of government bank examinations (Berger, Davies, and Flannery 2000;Flannery and Houston 1999;Berger and Davies 1998;Gunther and Moore 2003).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 68%
“…Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2009) characterize the TSLF and find that the initial operations were associated with a narrowing of repo spreads between less liquid and more liquid collateral. Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010) show statistically that changes in the amount outstanding under the facility are negatively related to changes in repo spreads. Interestingly, both studies show that the narrowing of spreads emanated more from an increase in Treasury repo rates than from a decrease in repo rates on less liquid collateral, suggesting that much of the effects of the facility came through easing the shortage of liquid Treasury collateral.…”
Section: B What Was the Effect Of The Facilities On Financial Markets?mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…McAndrews et al 2008, Fleming et al 2010)? To help answer these "what ifs," this paper goes to the Amsterdam Crisis of 1763 to find a shadow banking precedent.…”
Section: Gorton and Metrick 2010)? What If Governments And Centmentioning
confidence: 99%