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VAR analysis on a measure of bank lending standards collected by the Federal Reserve reveals that shocks to lending standards are significantly correlated with innovations in commercial loans at banks and in real output. Credit standards strongly dominate loan rates in explaining variation in business loans and output. Standards remain significant when we include various proxies for loan demand, suggesting that part of the standards fluctuations can be identified with changes in loan supply. Standards are also significant in structural equations of some categories of inventory investment, a GDP component closely associated with bank lending. The estimated impact of a moderate tightening of standards on inventory investment is of the same order of magnitude as the decline in inventory investment over the typical recession.

We investigate how integration of bank ownership across states has affected economic volatility within states. In theory, bank integration could cause higher or lower volatility, depending on whether credit supply or credit demand shocks predominate. In fact, year-to-year fluctuations in a state's economic growth fall as its banks become more integrated (via holding companies) with banks in other states. As the bank linkages between any pair of states increase, fluctuations in those two states tend to converge. We conclude that interstate banking has made state business cycles smaller, but more alike.

The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Moody's and S&P split more often over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts. Uncertainty over the banks stems from certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets. These findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation. (JEL G20, G21, G28)

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