2012
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1118858109
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Reply to Henrich et al.: Behavioral variation needs to be quantified at multiple levels

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Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Variation in cooperative behaviour – frequently measured through economic games – across different cultures (Henrich et al 2005; 2006; 2010a) is put forward as evidence that cooperation is a stable, persistent, and group-level trait on which selection at the level of the group could act. However, as we and others have argued elsewhere, high levels of variation in cooperative behaviour are also found within ethnic groups (Lamba & Mace 2011; 2012; Nettle et al 2011), suggesting that variation attributed to different cultural norms could in fact reflect individual adaptations to different environments. The F st data presented in the article supports the idea that countries differ in some beliefs and values, so at least one of the assumptions of CGS is met.…”
supporting
confidence: 60%
“…Variation in cooperative behaviour – frequently measured through economic games – across different cultures (Henrich et al 2005; 2006; 2010a) is put forward as evidence that cooperation is a stable, persistent, and group-level trait on which selection at the level of the group could act. However, as we and others have argued elsewhere, high levels of variation in cooperative behaviour are also found within ethnic groups (Lamba & Mace 2011; 2012; Nettle et al 2011), suggesting that variation attributed to different cultural norms could in fact reflect individual adaptations to different environments. The F st data presented in the article supports the idea that countries differ in some beliefs and values, so at least one of the assumptions of CGS is met.…”
supporting
confidence: 60%
“…Cultural evolution provides a potential explanation, because if cooperative behaviours are learned socially from others (social learning), then cooperation can spread within groups, and cooperative groups can outcompete relatively uncooperative groups [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]16]. The extent to which cultural evolution favours higher levels of cooperation is controversial [17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. First, theory suggests that the outcome of cultural evolution depends critically upon the mechanisms by which individuals obtain and use social information.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Important differences also exist between neighboring communities with no obvious cultural differences: adjacent Tsimane villages (Gurven et al 2008), different neighborhoods of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Nettle et al 2011), communities of horticulturalist-foragers less than 100 km apart (Lamba and Mace 2011). Quantitatively speaking, those intra-cultural differences are quite comparable to inter-cultural differences (Lamba and Mace 2012).…”
Section: Economic Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%