Recent studies argue that cross-cultural variation in human cooperation supports cultural group selection models of the evolution of large-scale cooperation. However, these studies confound cultural and environmental differences between populations by predominantly sampling one population per society. Here, we test the hypothesis that behavioral variation between populations is driven by environmental differences in demography and ecology. We use a public goods game played with money and a naturalistic measure of behavior involving the distribution of salt, an essential and locally valued resource, to demonstrate significant variation in levels of cooperation across 16 discrete populations of the same small-scale society, the Pahari Korwa of central India. Variation between these populations of the same cultural group is comparable to that found between different cultural groups in previous studies. Demographic factors partly explain this variation; age and a measure of social network size are associated with contributions in the public goods game, while population size and the number of adult sisters residing in the population are associated with decisions regarding salt. That behavioral variation is at least partly contingent on environmental differences between populations questions the existence of stable norms of cooperation. Hence, our findings call for reinterpretation of cross-cultural data on cooperation. Although cultural group selection could theoretically explain the evolution of large-scale cooperation, our results make clear that existing cross-cultural data cannot be taken as empirical support for this hypothesis.evolution of cooperation | cultural norms | common-pool resource | real-world measure | economic game S everal recent cross-cultural studies in small-scale (1-3) and large-scale (4-6) societies demonstrate variation in patterns of cooperation across cultural groups. This behavioral variation is attributed to culturally inherited cooperative norms and taken as support for cultural group selection models of large-scale cooperation (1, 2, 7). However, these studies have mostly sampled from one population per culture. Thus, they confound cultural and environmental differences between populations and cannot determine whether the behavioral variation across populations is driven by conformism to cultural norms or by environmental (demographic and ecological) differences. Crucially, the evolution of large-scale cooperation via cultural group selection (7-13) depends on behavior being acquired via cultural transmission, such that behavioral variation between populations is maintained by conformism to group norms.We examine whether there are differences in levels of cooperation across discrete populations of the same endogamous cultural group, and we find that environmental drivers (local ecology and demography) are responsible for behavioral variation across our study populations. Moreover, variation between these populations of the same cultural group is comparable to that found between differen...

The decision rules underpinning human cooperative behaviour are often investigated under laboratory conditions using monetary incentives. A major concern with this approach is that stake size may bias subjects’ decisions. This concern is particularly acute in online studies, where stakes are often far lower than those used in laboratory or field settings. We address this concern by conducting a Dictator Game using Amazon Mechanical Turk. In this two-player game, one player (the dictator) determines the division of an endowment between himself and the other player. We recruited subjects from India and the USA to play an online Dictator Game. Dictators received endowments of $1, $5 or $10. We collected two batches of data over two consecutive years. We found that players from India were less generous when playing with a $10 stake. By contrast, the effect of stake size among players from the USA was very small. This study indicates that the effects of stake size on decision making in economic games may vary across populations.

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Helping is a cornerstone of social organization and commonplace in human societies. A major challenge for the evolutionary sciences is to explain how cooperation is maintained in large populations with high levels of migration, conditions under which cooperators can be exploited by selfish individuals. Cultural group selection models posit that such large-scale cooperation evolves via selection acting on populations among which behavioural variation is maintained by the cultural transmission of cooperative norms. These models assume that individuals acquire cooperative strategies via social learning. This assumption remains empirically untested. Here, I test this by investigating whether individuals employ conformist or payoff-biased learning in public goods games conducted in 14 villages of a forager-horticulturist society, the Pahari Korwa of India. Individuals did not show a clear tendency to conform or to be payoff-biased and are highly variable in their use of social learning. This variation is partly explained by both individual and village characteristics. The tendency to conform decreases and to be payoff-biased increases as the value of the modal contribution increases. These findings suggest that the use of social learning in cooperative dilemmas is contingent on individuals' circumstances and environments, and question the existence of stably transmitted cultural norms of cooperation.