2015
DOI: 10.1038/nphoton.2015.207
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Reply to 'Discrete and continuous variables for measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography'

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Cited by 44 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…122,125 However, achieving the required efficiencies in a fibre-based optical network setting is more challenging, owing to the detector coupling loss and losses by fibre network interconnects and components 110 (see also ref. 126 for a different perspective). When high efficiency detectors are in place, CV MDI-QKD would require an asymmetric configuration, where Charlie needs to be located close to one of the users.…”
Section: Mdi-qkdmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…122,125 However, achieving the required efficiencies in a fibre-based optical network setting is more challenging, owing to the detector coupling loss and losses by fibre network interconnects and components 110 (see also ref. 126 for a different perspective). When high efficiency detectors are in place, CV MDI-QKD would require an asymmetric configuration, where Charlie needs to be located close to one of the users.…”
Section: Mdi-qkdmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that, in the field test of MDIQKD [23], three nodes are used, but the relay node does not share any key information and cannot be seen as a user. The MDIQKD network is theoretically discussed [25,26] but has yet to be developed. When extending to a network, quantum channels in a field environment may be very difficult to stabilize.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, protocols such as in Ref. [27][28][29], assuming measurementdevice-independence (MDI) [30,31] as a counter-measure against detectors' side-channel attacks, have extended the concept of CV-QKD to end-to-end network implementations [32]. For most of these protocols, not only experiments were shown [27,[33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40], but also their security analysis has been gradually refined to incorporate finite-size effects [41][42][43] and composable aspects [44][45][46].…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%