Replies to Commentaries

Abstract

In this reply, we will first address the concerns raised by Tim Ingold. Following this, we will turn our attention to issues raised by Patricia Miller.Ingold puts words in our mouths and views in our heads that are completely antithetical to what we believe and argue in this Monograph. We will divide our reply into two sets of comments. First, we address Ingold's general concerns about what he takes to be our view of cognitive development and its consequences for a vision of human nature. Second, we address his concerns about the project of interdisciplinary cooperation between anthropologists and psychologists, and his specific criticisms of our analysis of how Vezo adults and children construe human and animal kinds and the processes through which humans and animals become unique individuals. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN GENERALWe were appalled by what Ingold thinks we would (or do) deny. We too hold dear the tenets that he holds dear: human knowledge is socially situated and culturally constructed, that is, children acquire it from interacting with their elders and peers and by participating in their culture. We are constructivists, as we make clear repeatedly in our Monograph. We absolutely believe that children actively participate in the process of their own conceptual development. Indeed, our focus is on something that is needed to understand this socially constructive processFsomething that Ingold entirely leaves out of his discussionFnamely, what the child brings to the process. What is it about the human mind that makes the cultural construction of knowledge possible?Ingold is upset by the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge, and between innate and acquired learning mechanisms. We, like him, do not believe that people are made up of one bit that is innate, and one bit

Is Identity Essentialism a Fundamental Feature of Human Cognition?

“…Atran et al (2001), Sousa et al (2002), and Waxman et al (2007) have shown, respectively, that Mayan children and adults from Mexico, Brazilian children and adults, and Native Americans assume that the biological origins of an animal (in contrast to its rearing environment) determine many of its properties (see also Waxman et al, 2007 across various cultural and social settings in the United States). Similarly, Gil-White (2001) and Astuti et al (2004) have found, respectively, that Mongolian Torguuds and the Vezos of Madagascar (both children and adults) believe that the ethnic membership of a person's biological parents determines many of his/her characteristics; furthermore, both Mongolian Torguuds and Vezo children (but not Vezo adults) believe that ethnic identity depends on a person's biological parents rather than his/her rearing environment.…”

“…Similarly, Gil‐White (2001) and Astuti et al. (2004) have found, respectively, that Mongolian Torguuds and the Vezos of Madagascar (both children and adults) believe that the ethnic membership of a person's biological parents determines many of his/her characteristics; furthermore, both Mongolian Torguuds and Vezo children (but not Vezo adults) believe that ethnic identity depends on a person's biological parents rather than his/her rearing environment. In addition, Diesendruck (2001) has shown that, like American children (Diesendruck, Gelman, & Lebowitz, 1998), Brazilian children weigh internal properties (e.g., muscles, bones, and organs) as more diagnostic of category membership than superficial properties (e.g., size and place of dwelling).…”

“…Furthermore, they have also examined whether folk essentialism is a domain‐specific bias that originates from folk biology but is then applied to other domains (e.g., Atran, 1998) or whether it is a more domain‐general psychological disposition (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999), although no consensus has emerged on this issue (Solomon & Zaitchik, 2012). Finally, psychologists and anthropologists have studied folk essentialism from a cross‐cultural perspective, and they have argued that it is found across cultures (e.g., Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Atran et al., 2001; Birnbaum et al., 2010; Davoodi, Soley, Harris, & Blake, 2020; Diesendruck, 2001; Gil‐White, 2001; Mahalingam, 2003a, 2003b; Pereira, Estramiana, & Gallo, 2010; Sousa, Atran, & Medin, 2002; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007).…”

“…Cross‐cultural studies have often used the adoption (aka, switched‐at‐birth) scenarios originally developed by Gelman and Wellman (1991) (Astuti et al., 2004; Atran et al., 2001; Gil‐White, 2001; Sousa et al., 2002; Waxman et al., 2007). These scenarios examine whether people believe that an animal's (or a person's) category‐typical properties are determined by (i) the species (or group) membership of the animal's (or person's) genetic parents or (ii) the animal's (or person's) rearing environment.…”

“…A second limitation of cross‐cultural research on psychological essentialism is that it has mostly focused on people's intuitions about animal species (Astuti et al., 2004; Atran et al., 2001; Diesendruck, 2001; Sousa et al., 2002; Waxman et al., 2007) and social categories (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Gil‐White, 2001; Mahalingham, 2003a, 2003b; Pereira et al., 2010). Because the original and influential studies with American children and adults focused on animal species, it was natural to extend this work cross‐culturally by focusing on these categories.…”