Is Identity Essentialism a Fundamental Feature of Human Cognition?

Abstract

The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal = 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions—the “discovery” and “transformation” scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed.

Against Arguments From Diagnostic Reasoning

“…It should be noted that, in addition to Haukioja et al's and R&N's study, there are more studies indicating that people do not, or not solely, categorize natural kinds by virtue of scientific essence (see, e.g., Braisby, Franks, & Hampton, 1996;Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007;Machery et al, 2023;Malt, 1994;Tobia, Newman, & Knobe, 2020). For at least some of these studies, one might very well construct an argument from diagnostic reasoning to attempt to explain the results as being in accordance with the scientific essence view.…”