Replicator equation on networks with degree regular communities

Cassese, Daniele

doi:10.1007/s41109-018-0083-2

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…This approach was extensively used to study cooperation in structured populations, where analytical expressions are derived for three update rules: Birth-Death (BD), Death-Birth (DB) and Imitation (IM) [7], [8]. A recent work has extended the replicator equation to regular communities, namely introducing heterogeneity in the game dynamics [9], and providing numerical results in terms of stability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lower Network Degrees Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma With Environmental Feedback

Stella

Baar

Bauso

2022

IEEE Control Syst. Lett.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lower Network Degrees Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma With Environmental Feedback

Stella

Baar

Bauso

2022

IEEE Control Syst. Lett.

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“…In well-mixed populations, where the literature historically begins, cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games is never favored [16]. For Bd updating, cooperation is also never favored on regular graphs like the cycle [17], in which every node has the same number of neighbors [9,[18][19][20][21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intriguing effects of selection intensity on the evolution of prosocial behaviors

McAvoy

Rao

Hauert

2021

Preprint

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In many models of evolving populations, genetic drift has an outsized role relative to natural selection, or vice versa. While there are many scenarios in which one of these two assumptions is reasonable, intermediate balances between these forces are also biologically relevant. In this study, we consider some natural axioms for modeling intermediate selection intensities, and we explore how to quantify the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such a process. To illustrate the sensitivity of evolutionary dynamics to drift and selection, we show that there can be a "sweet spot" for the balance of these two forces, with sufficient noise for rare mutants to become established and sufficient selection to subsequently spread. In particular, this balance allows prosocial traits to evolve in evolutionary models that were previously thought to be unconducive to the emergence and spread of altruistic behaviors. Furthermore, the effects of selection intensity on long-run evolutionary outcomes in these settings, such as when there is global competition for reproduction, can be highly non-monotonic. Although intermediate selection intensities (neither weak nor strong) are notoriously difficult to study analytically, they are often biologically relevant; and the results we report here suggest that they can elicit novel and rich dynamics in the evolution of prosocial behaviors.

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“…In order to resist defection and promote cooperation, many effective mechanisms have been put forward in evolutionary game studies, such as kin selection, [10] direct reciprocity, [11][12][13] group selection, reputation, [14][15][16] reward, [17][18][19][20] punishment, [21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28] spatial structure, [29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41] and so on. [42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49] To further reveal the underlying reasons of the emergence of cooperation in the PGG, in this paper, we explore a new mechanism, i.e., deposit mechanism, which is originated from our real life. In the realistic world, people often prefer to get a product or service at a relatively lower price.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit*

Wang¹,

Chen²

2019

Chinese Phys. B

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The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences. We introduce a new mechanism, deposit mechanism, into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population. Firstly, we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy, namely, deposit cooperation. The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy, when the provision of public good is successful. Then, we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics. Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population, and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game. On the one hand, when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system, increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population. On the other hand, if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point, it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit, and raising the threshold of public good.

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Replicator equation on networks with degree regular communities

Cited by 7 publications

References 25 publications

Lower Network Degrees Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma With Environmental Feedback

Lower Network Degrees Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma With Environmental Feedback

Intriguing effects of selection intensity on the evolution of prosocial behaviors

The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit*

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