The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit*

Wang, Xianjia; Chen, Wen-Man

doi:10.1088/1674-1056/28/8/080201

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 52 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Moran process is a classic evolutionary process. [53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63] It represents a basic example of two species competing in the same environment, wherein individuals with higher fitness may be selected for reproduction. Although both models can describe the stochastic evolution of two-state individual sets, they have obvious differences, such as the order in which interacting individuals are selected.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voter model on adaptive networks

2022

Chinese Phys. B

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Voter model is an important basic model in statistical physics. In recent years, it has been more and more used to describe the process of opinion formation in sociophysics. In real complex systems, the interactive network of individuals is dynamically adjusted, and the evolving network topology and individual behaviors affect each other. Therefore, we propose a linking dynamics to describe the coevolution of network topology and individual behaviors in this paper, and study the voter model on the adaptive network. We theoretically analyze the properties of the voter model, including consensus probability and time. The evolution of opinions on dynamic networks is further analyzed from the perspective of evolutionary game. Finally, a case study of real data is shown to verify the effectiveness of the theory.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voter model on adaptive networks

2022

Chinese Phys. B

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…[26] In evolutionary games on graphs, natural selection favors defection, for cooperation to emerge, a mechanism for the promotion of cooperation is needed. During the past two decades, a wide range of mechanisms have been proposed to promote the evolution of cooperation, including image scoring, [27] reputation, [28] teaching activities, [29] reward [21] and punishment, [30,31] spatial structure in memorybased SDG, [32] compassion, [33] transaction costs, [34] deposit mechanism, [35] benefit community, [36] and break and establishment of links, etc. [37] Typically, Nowak proposed five rules [38] for the evolution of cooperation, which includes in-direct reciprocity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputational preference and other-regarding preference based rewarding mechanism promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas*

Pei¹,

Yan²,

Wang³

2021

Chinese Phys. B

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To study the incentive mechanisms of cooperation, we propose a preference rewarding mechanism in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, which simultaneously considers reputational preference, other-regarding preference and the dynamic adjustment of vertex weight. The vertex weight of a player is adaptively adjusted according to the comparison result of his own reputation and the average reputation value of his immediate neighbors. Players are inclined to pay a personal cost to reward the cooperative neighbor with the greatest vertex weight. The vertex weight of a player is proportional to the preference rewards he can obtain from direct neighbors. We find that the preference rewarding mechanism significantly facilitates the evolution of cooperation, and the dynamic adjustment of vertex weight has powerful effect on the emergence of cooperative behavior. To validate multiple effects, strategy distribution and the average payoff and fitness of players are discussed in a microcosmic view.

show abstract

“…Though the domination of defective behavior is studied in the theoretical evolutionary process, cooperative behavior is often observed by social and biological scientists in the real world. A variety of effective mechanisms, including network reciprocity, have been proposed in many studies [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19] to explain the emergence of cooperation. Previous studies concerning solutions to social dilemmas have largely assumed that the utilities of players, which are considered as objective utilities, are determined by interactions with their neighbors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks

Wang

Chen

2020

J. Stat. Mech.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper considers the utility of each player consisting of two parts: the objective utility and subjective utilities. We assume that a player obtains its objective utility from the interactions with its neighbors in the spatial population. Besides, the subjective utility, which is largely ignored by previous studies, is determined by its attitudes. Here, we focus on how attitudes affect the evolution of cooperation on two different complex networks, the namely square lattice and Barabási–Albert scale-free network. First, the simulations indicate that populations with a higher average attitude can achieve a higher level of cooperation. Furthermore, a positive average attitude is conducive to promoting cooperation, while a negative average attitude leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, in populations with a positive average attitude, as the attitude heterogeneity increases, the average level of cooperation decreases. Conversely, in populations with a negative average attitude, increased attitude heterogeneity induces the promotion of cooperation.

show abstract

The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit*

Cited by 5 publications

References 52 publications

Voter model on adaptive networks

Voter model on adaptive networks

Reputational preference and other-regarding preference based rewarding mechanism promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas*

Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About