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2005
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-31957-3_56
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Replay Attacks in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: Protecting the OLSR Protocol

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…At Medium Access Control layer, passive eavesdropping and jamming attack will decrease the traffic transmission rate. At network layer, black hole, gray hole, worm hole attacks [61] , flooding attacks [62] , and replay attacks [63] can bring failed data transmission. Flooding and desynchronization attacks can occur at transport layer.…”
Section: Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At Medium Access Control layer, passive eavesdropping and jamming attack will decrease the traffic transmission rate. At network layer, black hole, gray hole, worm hole attacks [61] , flooding attacks [62] , and replay attacks [63] can bring failed data transmission. Flooding and desynchronization attacks can occur at transport layer.…”
Section: Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Figure 2 illustrates a typical replay attack scenario where malicious MN, in the first step, intercepts and records signed messages listened from sender MN S. In second step and after a waiting time, within the timestamp discrepancy interval t  , the attacker MN resends the stored signed messages, towards the receive MN D. As a result, all re-send messages by the replay attacker that verify the timestamp discrepancy present an overhead of messages which impact directly the network performance. Recent works [22][23][24] are still using, in the process of message signature, a prefixed timestamp discrepancy t  negotiated in the step of encryption key exchange [25]. This choice of static timestamp gives a greatest weakness due to its independence on MN characteristics and duration of communication.…”
Section: T mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…OLSR protection schemes: The protection schemes proposed for the OLSR protocol, [1][8] [19], rely on signed routing messages and sequence numbers or timestamps. The messages are signed hop-by-hop or end-to-end.…”
Section: Securing Olsr With Ibsmentioning
confidence: 99%