Repeated coordination with private learning

Abstract

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.

Learning Efficiency of Multiagent Information Structures

“…In this case, players' past actions can reveal information about their private signals. Basu, Chatterjee, Hoshino, and Tamuz (2020) and Sugaya and Yamamoto (2020) study such settings and construct equilibria that lead to common learning. An interesting open question is to analyze the speed of common learning and how this is affected by players' strategic incentives.…”

Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures

“…In this case, players' past actions can reveal information about their private signals. Basu, Chatterjee, Hoshino, and Tamuz (2020) and Sugaya and Yamamoto (2020) study such settings and construct equilibria that lead to common learning. An interesting open question is to analyze the speed of common learning and how this is affected by players' strategic incentives.…”