Multi‐agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty

Hoshino, Tetsuya

doi:10.1111/iere.12546

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…However, this would not work as desired in general, since the averaged condition of sequential obedience may well be too coarse to control the incentives there. In Supplemental Appendix B.2.2, we report a special case which in effect reduces to a binary‐action case, but still covers the result of Hoshino (2022). We have to leave for future research identifying a broader class of games in which our current approach works (with minimal modifications), or developing a new idea in constructing information structures, possibly along with a more refined sequential obedience‐like condition 29…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

Morris,

Oyama,

Takahashi

2024

ECTA

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What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary‐action supermodular games? An outcome is partially implementable if it satisfies obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome is smallest equilibrium implementable (induced by the smallest equilibrium). Smallest equilibrium implementation requires a stronger sequential obedience condition: there is a stochastic ordering of players under which players are prepared to switch to the high action even if they think only those before them will switch. We then characterize the optimal outcome induced by an information designer who prefers the high action to be played, but anticipates that the worst (hence smallest) equilibrium will be played. In a potential game, under convexity assumptions on the potential and the designer's objective, it is optimal to choose an outcome where actions are perfectly coordinated (all players choose the same action), with the high action profile played on the largest event where that action profile maximizes the average potential.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The trading game had binary actions but was not supermodular, and the methods were different from this paper. Bergemann and Morris (2019, Section 7.1) and Hoshino (2022) illustrated the implications of the higher order beliefs literature for information design.…”

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confidence: 99%

Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

Morris,

Oyama,

Takahashi

2024

ECTA

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“…Multi-receiver extension of this two-player game, often referred to as information design, has also received wide interest [4]. Even though multi-receiver settings with inter-dependent actions are receiving some attention now [11], these settings are less well understood because of the complexities associated with them. Our work gives insights on information design in such settings.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Equating µ 2 = 1 to the explicitly written out posterior probability correspond to the case p l = 1. This is the downplaying policy, as defined in (11). Following (22), e * (µ) is concave for µ ∈ [0, µ d ), if R(b; µ) > 0 ∀µ < µ d and convex for µ ∈ (µ d , 1] if R(b; µ) < 0 ∀µ > µ d .…”

Section: A3 Proof Of Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Scalable Bayesian Persuasion Framework for Epidemic Containment on Heterogeneous Networks

Pathak¹,

Kulkarni²

2022

Preprint

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During an epidemic, the information available to individuals in the society deeply influences their belief of the epidemic spread, and consequently the preventive measures they take to stay safe from the infection. In this paper, we develop a scalable framework for ascertaining the optimal information disclosure a government must make to individuals in a networked society for the purpose of epidemic containment. This problem of information design problem is complicated by the heterogeneous nature of the society, the positive externalities faced by individuals, and the variety in the public response to such disclosures. We use a networked public goods model to capture the underlying societal structure. Our first main result is a structural decomposition of the government's objectives into two independent components -a component dependent on the utility function of individuals, and another dependent on properties of the underlying network. Since the network dependent term in this decomposition is unaffected by the signals sent by the government, this characterization simplifies the problem of finding the optimal information disclosure policies. We find explicit conditions, in terms of the risk aversion and prudence, under which no disclosure, full disclosure, exaggeration and downplay are the optimal policies. The structural decomposition results are also helpful in studying other forms of interventions like incentive design and network design.

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“… See also Bergemann and Morris (, Section 7) and Hoshino () for discussions on the relationship between robustness and information design with adversarial equilibrium selection. …”

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confidence: 99%

Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

Oyama

Takahashi

2020

ECTA

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This paper studies the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information in binary‐action supermodular games. Using a generalized version of belief operator, we explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound on the probability of a common belief event, uniform over type spaces, when the underlying game has a monotone potential. Conversely, when the game has no monotone potential, we construct a type space with an arbitrarily high probability event in which players never have common belief about that event. As an implication of these results, we show for generic binary‐action supermodular games that an action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. Our study offers new methodology and insight to the analysis of global game equilibrium selection.

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Multi‐agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty

Cited by 11 publications

References 21 publications

Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

A Scalable Bayesian Persuasion Framework for Epidemic Containment on Heterogeneous Networks

Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

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