Reorganising power in Indonesia: The politics of Oligarchy in an age of markets

Robison, Richard; Hadiz, Vedi R.

doi:10.1080/00074910500306619

Cited by 88 publications

(111 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In Indonesia, political power tends to be in the hands of predatory politico-business elites that rely on 'money politics' to fund systems of patronage that support their authority (Robison and Hadiz 2004). Thus, the MoA became a particularly important ministry in the predecentralisation era, because it was responsible for regulating the lucrative agribusiness and livestock sectors.…”

Section: The Politics Of 'Viral Sovereignty'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Avian influenza, ‘viral sovereignty’, and the politics of health security in Indonesia

Hameiri¹

2014

The Pacific Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In December 2006, Indonesian Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, shocked the world when announcing her government would no longer be sharing samples of the H5N1 avian flu virus, collected from Indonesian patients, with the World Health Organization, at a time when global fears of a deadly influenza pandemic were running high. For observers of Southeast Asian politics, the decision reinforced the view of the region as made up of states determined to protect their national sovereignty, at almost all costs. This established view of the region, however, generally neglects the variable and selective manner in which sovereignty has been invoked by Southeast Asian governments, or parts thereof, and fails to identify the conditions shaping the deployment of sovereignty. In this article, it is argued that Siti's action was designed to harness claims of sovereignty to a domestic political struggle. It was a response to the growing fragmentation and, in some cases, denationalisation of the governance apparatus dealing with public health in Indonesia, along with the 'securitisation' of H5N1 internationally. The examination of the virus-sharing dispute demonstrates that in Southeast Asia sovereignty is not so much the ends of government action, but the means utilised by government actors for advancing particular political goals.

show abstract

Section: The Politics Of 'Viral Sovereignty'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Avian influenza, ‘viral sovereignty’, and the politics of health security in Indonesia

Hameiri¹

2014

The Pacific Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…At that time, the political reform immediately implemented after the end of the New Order regime. Post-reformation, the changes in Indonesian politic was mainly characterized by the strengthening of the oligarchy [3] This group is the old forces that took over the reformation process in order to maintain and even increase their own wealth. They want to be protected through the protectionist policies.…”

Section: Challenges Of Democracy Duringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization and Democracy: Challenges for Indonesia

Ismanto

2018

Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For Indonesia, an economic crisis which hit the country in 1997 was a blessing in disguise. Without that, it is quite difficult to bring the dramatic social changes for the country, including the overthrown of the authoritarian rule. Economic crisis has promoted economic liberalization and weakened the ideas of protectionist economic policy. Indonesia's commitment inpromoting economic liberalization has also encouraged the country to take an active role in promoting regional economic forums. Indonesia uses ASEAN as a collective bargaining in response to the changing global economy. In this case, the establishment of AEC can be regarded as an instrument for ASEAN in response to the global economy. Unfortunately, Indonesia's commitment in encouraging a deeper economic integration of ASEAN has not been supported by its domestic politics in promoting the substantial democracy. Corruption has become a serious problem for the country in promotingdemocracy along with its commitment in response to globalization.

show abstract

Section: Research Design and Case Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Altogether, this extensive involvement of Arief's siblings blurred the boundary between JP and the Arief family's other activities. The Ariefs appeared to treat JP as part of the family's politico-business activities, something not uncommon in Indonesia (Robison & Hadiz, 2004).…”

Section: Venture Outreachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The value of political connections in Indonesia is well documented (Carney, Dieleman, & Taussig, 2017;Fisman, 2001). It is common knowledge among scholars of Indonesian business that political ties are an integral part of the private sector (e.g., Robison & Hadiz, 2004;Van Klinken & Aspinall, 2011) and their management represents a key success factor for organizations (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008).In 2006, the Indonesian government issued the national biofuels development blueprint, which aimed to replace up to 10% of the national fossil fuel consumption with biofuels and create employment for 3.5 million people on 5.25 million hectares of unused land by 2010 (Priyanto, 2008). This blueprint was supported by various regulations, policies and subsidies such as a special credit program and an assured market through a minimum quota of 5% biofuel content in oil sold by Pertamina, the state-owned oil company.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

Dieleman

Widjaja

2018

Asia Pac J Manag

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We advance the resource dependence literature on appropriation of organizational resources by powerful partners, focusing on political ties. Using a unique emerging market case of a venture with political ties, we advance theory by unpacking how political connections can hurt the organization by increasing the permeability of organizational boundaries. Our extensions highlight the crucial role of control mechanisms for politically connected organizations.Keywords Organizational boundary . Resource dependence . Political ties . PermeabilityOrganizations commonly seek to create linkages with external parties to access key resources and opportunities (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004), especially in emerging economies (Ahlstrom, Young, Nair, & Law, 2003). Yet these linkages also carry some costs and risks (Lin & Si, 2010). Researchers employing resource dependence theory (RDT) in particular have shown that risks are prevalent when there is a power imbalance, as powerful partners may appropriate organizational resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005;Emerson, 1962;Gulati & Singh, 1998;Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Although considerable research has advanced our knowledge of the conditions under which organizations seek partnerships (e.g., Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009;Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008), we know much less about the mechanisms by which powerful partners appropriate resources (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016;Xia, 2011) and, in turn, how weaker organizations can seek to protect themselves (Katila et al., 2008). This is important as smaller firms increasingly enter new markets and must partner with larger (and sometimes) state linked partners creating relationships that need to be carefully managed (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Rubanik, 2011). How companies can protect themselves against appropriation is a relatively recent but important research topic within RDT, especially in the context of powerful political ties, an area where capture by powerful partners is particularly acute. Political ties link the organization to the government with potentially beneficial effects (Hillman, 2005), but they cannot be fully controlled and may create their own problems such the extraction of rents or derailing strategy (Fan, Wong, & Li, 2007;Lin & Si, 2010;Shleifer & Vishny, 1994;Siegel, 2007;Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016;Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). A new generation of RDT research suggests this problem is particularly salient in emerging economies, where new ventures often need powerful political ties to acquire resources such as licenses to operate and build legitimacy, but this can yield a power imbalance that may stimulate appropriation of firm resources (Mellahi et al., 2016).A few recent studies address the question how appropriation works. For instance, Sun et al. (2016) detailed how substantial shareholders colluded with political ties to expropriate minority shareholders, but they focus mostly on well-established publicly listed companies. Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) investig...

show abstract

Reorganising power in Indonesia: The politics of Oligarchy in an age of markets

Cited by 88 publications

References 0 publications

Avian influenza, ‘viral sovereignty’, and the politics of health security in Indonesia

Avian influenza, ‘viral sovereignty’, and the politics of health security in Indonesia

Globalization and Democracy: Challenges for Indonesia

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About