Rent-Seeking with Scarce Talent: A Model of Preemptive Hiring

Dakhlia, Sami; Pecorino, Paul

doi:10.2139/ssrn.598378

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Result 3 is an application of the results on bidding for scarce talent found in Dakhlia and Pecorino (2006). The result that scarce talent signs with the team earning the higher rent is quite general 18 (see Dakhlia and Pecorino, 2006, pp.…”

Section: The Model With Collusion In the Market For Playersmentioning

confidence: 85%

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Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

Farmer

Pecorino

2008

SSRN Journal

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Section: The Model With Collusion In the Market For Playersmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…We model both the coach and the player as scarce talent, and as such we draw heavily on the results of Dakhlia and Pecorino (2006). In our simple model, there are two teams and only one high talent coach and one high talent player.…”

Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

Farmer

Pecorino

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…Dakhlia and Pecorino (2004) consider a rent‐seeking model where teams not only bid for a quantity of talent but also submit a bid for the wage rate per unit of talent. If each team offers the same wage rate then the Nash equilibrium distribution of talent will be the same as above.…”

Section: Trading Mechanisms and The Allocation Of Talentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Champions League and the Coase Theorem

Szymanski

2007

Scottish J Political Eco

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This paper considers the relevance of the Coase Theorem to the analysis of sports leagues. It is widely believed that there exists an ideal competitive balance between teams in a sporting contest, and that without competitive restraints to redistribute resources championships will be too unbalanced. The paper reviews the empirical evidence on this issue to date, and then examines a model where the outcome may be either too little or too much competitive balance. Empirical evidence from English football suggests that the bias is likely to be in favour of too much competitive balance. The implications for European football in general and the Champions League in particular are then discussed.

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The Champions League and the Coase Theorem

Szymanski

2010

Football Economics and Policy

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The Coase Theorem is both one of the simplest and most profound ideas in economics. Coase's insight was first expressed in print as a theorem by George Stigler, following the publication of the famous article "The Problem of Social Cost" by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase (1960). Stigler stated it thus: "with zero transactions costs, private and social costs will be equal". In this paper the Coase Theorem is approached through the medium of a sports league. While Coase's article dates from 1960, a colleague at Chicago University published a discussion of the market for baseball players in 1956 which almost completely anticipates the more famous paper (Rottenberg (1956)).

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Rent-Seeking with Scarce Talent: A Model of Preemptive Hiring

Cited by 3 publications

References 26 publications

Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

The Champions League and the Coase Theorem

The Champions League and the Coase Theorem

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