While economists have been studying the family as an economic unit for almost thirty years, most models have focused on cooperative family units. Domestic violence, one of the most widespread violent crimes against women, is one example of a family unit that is better explained as a noncooperative re1ationship. In this paper, a noncooperative model of domestic violence is presented. The comparative statics from this model predict that women's incomes and other financial support received from outside the marriage (family, welfare, shelters, divorce settlements, etc.) will decrease the level of violence in intact families because they increase the woman's threat point. Implications of the theoretical model are discussed and empirical evidence is summarized. The results from existing and new analysis provide support for the hypothesis that improved economic opportunities for women will decrease the level of violence in abusive re1ationships.domestic violence, household bargaining, noncooperative,

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According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the incidence of domestic violence decreased during the 1990s. Understanding the causes of this decline could offer important insight into designing effective policies to continue this trend. This article uses the Area-Identified National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), the same data used to generate the DOJ's national estimates, merged with countylevel variables, to examine the determinants of women reporting abuse. The results indicate that there are three important factors that likely contribute to the decline: (1) the increased provision of legal services for victims of intimate partner abuse, (2) improvements in women's economic status, and (3) demographic trends, most notably the aging of the population. (JEL J12, J16, J22)

This article proposes a dynamic labor markef discrimination model based onBayesian updating qf belit$ by the employer. The employer firms initial beli+ of worker ability conditional on group and updates his belit$ each period based on observed output. lnaccurate initial priors lead to diminished human capital investment among members qf the undervalued group and may generate inequities lasting many periods or men permanently. Statistical discrimination models in which differing variances drive the inequity are special cases 4 the model.

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This article explores the theoretical and behavioral impact of conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration (FOA) when parties are bargaining over an uncertain value. In this context, one player receives a fixed payment while the other player receives the uncertain residual. Although both forms of arbitration have identically sized contract zones, we show theoretically that in FOA the contract zone shifts in favor of the residual claimant. In addition, as the variance of the possible values rises, the contract zone shifts further in favor of the residual claimant. In laboratory testing, the contract zone roughly reflects the central tendencies of behavior; however, both forms of arbitration increase conflict relative to a no-arbitration baseline. This is caused by residual claimants being more aggressive when arbitration is available while fixed-payment recipients are not. However, both parties play a role in the conflict escalation due to the increased proposal variation.

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Prostitution is a multi-billion dollar, globally distributed, low-concentration service industry that is receiving increasing attention in the economics literature. This article focuses on a widespread, but little studied, feature of this environment-the role of intermediaries (pimps or brothel owners) on market outcomes. Prostitution laws and markets are perhaps unique in that transactions between principals (prostitutes and johns) are legal in many countries, while intermediary activity (pimping) is illegal. After surveying the varying cross-country legality of agents we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze how the presence or absence of intermediaries shifts the distribution of market surplus. We show that eliminating pimps and brothels may shift surplus in non-obvious ways, depending on the precise function they perform and on whether equilibrium is pooling or separating across ''high quality'' and ''low quality'' market segments. The implications of alternative policy regimes (intermediaries legal or illegal) are considered.