Rent seeking with private values

Malueg, David A.; Yates, Andrew J.

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_36

Cited by 28 publications

(59 citation statements)

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“…By considering the case in which each player has a continuum of possible types, we allow for a much richer and more general specification of uncertainty than previous models which consider only two possible types of each player, such as Hurley and Shogren (1998a) and Malueg and Yates (2004).…”

Section: Results: Continuous Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For exam-ple, Harstad (1995) looks at a model with asymmetrically informed agents, but in the context of a winner-take-all game. Hurley and Shogren (1998b) and Schoonbeek and Winkel (2006) both consider models with one-sided incomplete information, while Hurley and Shogren (1998a) and Malueg and Yates (2004) present models with two-sided incomplete information in which both players' valuations are either high or low. Additionally, recent work on existence of equilibria in rent-seeking contests includes Cornes and Hartley (2005) and Malueg and Yates (2006), but these papers assume complete information.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This simple formulation of uncertainty has been previously examined by Hurley and Shogren (1998a) and Malueg and Yates (2004).…”

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Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

Fey

2007

Public Choice

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Section: Results: Continuous Casementioning

confidence: 99%

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Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

Fey

2007

Public Choice

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“…To see the intuition of our result, let us directly compare the equilibrium e¤orts 13 One can also extend this to an incomplete information setting (Malueg and Yates, 2004;Fey, 2008). Allowing types A i 2 fA L ; A H g, each agent has a probability of drawing A L with 1/2 and A H with 1/2.…”

Section: Comparison Of Pigouvian and Coasean Solutions 341 Equilibrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling Externalities in the Presence of Rent Seeking

MacKenzie

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractContests are a common method to describe the distribution of many di¤erent types of rents. Yet in many of these situations the utilisation of the prize plays an important role in determining agents'payo¤s and incentives. In this paper, we investigate the incentives to expend e¤ort for a prize that produces consumption externalities and consider alternative regulatory policies. We …nd relatively more global consumption externalities will increase (decrease) rent seeking when consumption externalities are negative (positive). We show how introducing Pigouvian taxation (possibly with revenue transfer) and Coasean bargaining alters equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤s. Pigouvian taxation tends to reduce both e¤ort and payo¤s whereas this is not always the case for Coasean bargaining. In the presence of suf…ciently large consumption externalities, establishing Pigouvian taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer may reduce costly rent seeking e¤ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches.

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“…1 For instance, in Konrad's (2009) textbook, incomplete information is discussed only sparingly. Likewise, in their collection of papers on rent seeking, Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008) include only two papers, Wärneryd (2003) and Malueg and Yates (2004), which focus explicitly on incomplete information. Malueg and Yates (2004) concentrate on the Tullock contest; see Fey (2008) for a similar model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests

Kirkegaard

2013

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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In a deterministic contest or all-pay auction, all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical. As one contestant becomes "stronger", that is, values the prize more, total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically. Thus, asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation. Recently, this result has been shown to hold for other, non-deterministic, contest success functions as well, thereby suggesting a certain robustness. In this paper, however, the complete information assumption is shown to be crucial. I examine a tractable incomplete information model for which the complete information model is a special case. With incomplete information -regardless of how little -total expenditures in a deterministic two-player contest increase when one contestant becomes marginally stronger, starting from a symmetric contest. In fact, both contestants expend resources more aggressively; with complete information, neither of them do so. Thus, there is a "discontinuity" in the information structure. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C72, D44, D72, D82.

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Rent seeking with private values

Cited by 28 publications

References 3 publications

Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

Controlling Externalities in the Presence of Rent Seeking

Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests

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