Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

Fey, Mark

doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9255-9

Cited by 86 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…To see the intuition of our result, let us directly compare the equilibrium e¤orts 13 One can also extend this to an incomplete information setting (Malueg and Yates, 2004;Fey, 2008). Allowing types A i 2 fA L ; A H g, each agent has a probability of drawing A L with 1/2 and A H with 1/2.…”

Section: Comparison Of Pigouvian and Coasean Solutions 341 Equilibrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling Externalities in the Presence of Rent Seeking

MacKenzie

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractContests are a common method to describe the distribution of many di¤erent types of rents. Yet in many of these situations the utilisation of the prize plays an important role in determining agents'payo¤s and incentives. In this paper, we investigate the incentives to expend e¤ort for a prize that produces consumption externalities and consider alternative regulatory policies. We …nd relatively more global consumption externalities will increase (decrease) rent seeking when consumption externalities are negative (positive). We show how introducing Pigouvian taxation (possibly with revenue transfer) and Coasean bargaining alters equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤s. Pigouvian taxation tends to reduce both e¤ort and payo¤s whereas this is not always the case for Coasean bargaining. In the presence of suf…ciently large consumption externalities, establishing Pigouvian taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer may reduce costly rent seeking e¤ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches.

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Section: Comparison Of Pigouvian and Coasean Solutions 341 Equilibrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling Externalities in the Presence of Rent Seeking

MacKenzie

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…2 Shogren (1998a, 1998b) consider other special cases. Fey (2008) proves existence of equilibrium in a model where the type of each player is drawn from a uniform distribution.…”

Section: Delegationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informational Aspects of Conflict

Wärneryd¹

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

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“…Ewerhart (2010) fully characterizes the Bayesian equilibrium for symmetric rent-seeking contests with independent private valuations and Ewerhart (2014) shows uniqueness of the equilibrium for continuous types. Fey (2008) and Wasser (2013) introduce informational asymmetries on the costs of effort provision. In Morath and Münster (2013) players may acquire information on their valuations, and opponents observe whether or not information was acquired but do not learn the information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%