Rent Seeking and Power Hierarchies: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation with Antagonistic Links

Huremović, Kenan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2441848

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…It is linked to the growing literature on the economics of networks (e.g., Bramoullé, Kranton, and D'Amours (2014), Jackson (2008), Jackson and Zenou (2014)). Franke and Öztürk (2015) and Huremovic (2014) studied strategic interactions of multiple agents in conflict networks. Two recent papers by Hiller (2017) and Jackson and Nei (2014) studied the endogenous formation of networks in conflict models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa

König¹,

Rohner²,

Thoenig³

et al. 2017

Econometrica

148

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We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico‐economic theory of conflict. We obtain a closed‐form characterization of the Nash equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. The estimates of the fighting externalities are then used to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) dismantling specific fighting groups involved in the conflict; (ii) weapon embargoes; (iii) interventions aimed at pacifying animosity among groups. Finally, with the aid of a random utility model, we study how policy shocks can induce a reshaping of the network structure.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa

König¹,

Rohner²,

Thoenig³

et al. 2017

Econometrica

148

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“…The network is taken as given. In a recent paper, Huremovic (2014) studies conflict in an evolving network. We have assumed that nodes engage in conflict, but a natural question is whether they have an incentive to engage in conflict.…”

Section: Dynamics Of Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Networks

Dziubiński

Goyal

Vigier

2016

The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks

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Conflict remains a central element in human interaction. Networks -social, economic and infrastructure -are a defining feature of society. The two intersect in a wide range of empirical contexts. This motivates the recent interest in conflict and networks. The aim of the survey is to present the general themes, provide a survey of the nascent research and point to a number of interesting open questions. AbstractConflict remains a central element in human interaction. Networks -social, economic and infrastructure -are a defining feature of society. The two intersect in a wide range of empirical contexts. This motivates the recent interest in conflict and networks.The aim of the survey is to present the general themes, provide a survey of the nascent research and point to a number of interesting open questions. We thank the editors for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. We also thank Vessela Daskalova, Julien Gagnon, Michiel de Jong, and Anja Prummer for helpful discussions. Marcin Dziubiński acknowledges support from Homing Plus programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, via the project 'Strategic Resilience of Networks'. Sanjeev Goyal acknowledges support from a Keynes Fellowship, The Cambridge-INET Institute and the European Research Area Complexity-Net under grant 'Resilience and interaction of networks in ecology and economics'.Conflict remains a central element in human interaction. Networks -social, economic and infrastructure -are a defining feature of society. So it is natural that the two should intersect in a wide range of empirical contexts. This motivates the recent interest on conflict and networks. The aim of the paper is to provide a survey of this research.We find it useful to start with specific empirical phenomena involving conflict and networks.1. Robustness of Infrastructure Networks: Highways, aviation, shipping, pipelines, train systems, and telecommunication networks are central to a modern economy. These networks face a variety of threats ranging from natural disasters to human attacks. The latter may take a violent form (guerrilla attacks, attacks by an enemy country, and terrorism) or a non-violent form (as in political protest that blocks transport services). 1 A network can be made robust to such threats through additional investments in equipment and in personnel. As networks are pervasive, the investments needed could be very large; this motivates the study of targeted defence. What are the 'key' parts of the network that should be protected to ensure maximal functionality? Moreover, taking a longer term view, how should networks be designed to enhance their robustness to threats?2. Cybersecurity: As energy, communication, travel, consumer interaction increasingly adopt digital networks, cybersecurity has emerged as a major priority. In the United States, this is a responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its mission statement reads,"Our daily life, economic vitality, and national security depend on a stable, safe, and resilient cyberspace. We rely on ...

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“…See also Shamma and Arslan (2004) who unify existing Lyapunov arguments in a set-up with a "soft-max" best response. 4 Recent papers that look at con ‡ict networks include Bozbay and Vesperoni (2018), Dziubiński et al (2016a), Franke and Öztürk (2015), Huremović (2014), Jackson and Nei (2015), König et al (2017), Kovenock et al (2015), Kovenock and Roberson (2018), Matros and Rietzke (2018), and Xu et al (2019), among others. For a survey, see Dziubiński et al (2016b).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fictitious play in networks

Ewerhart

Valkanova

2020

Games and Economic Behavior

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This paper studies …ctitious play in networks of noncooperative twoperson games. We show that continuous-time …ctitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1= , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary nperson zero-sum games with bilinear payo¤ functions do not possess the continuoustime …ctitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is either strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential game, or a twoby-two game. In those cases, convergence requires a condition on bilateral payo¤s or, alternatively, that the network is acyclic. Our results hold also for the discrete-time variant of …ctitious play, which implies, in particular, a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, con ‡ict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection.

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Rent Seeking and Power Hierarchies: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation with Antagonistic Links

Cited by 6 publications

References 25 publications

Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa

Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa

Conflict and Networks

Fictitious play in networks

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