Remotely controlling TrustZone applications? A study on securely and resiliently receiving remote commands

Abstract

Mobile devices are becoming an indispensable part of work for corporations and governments to store and process sensitive information. Thus, it is important for remote administrators to maintain control of these devices via Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions. ARM TrustZone has been widely regarded as the de facto solution for protecting the security-sensitive software, such as MDM agents, from attacks of a compromised rich OS. However, little attention has been given to protecting the MDM control channel, a fundamental component for a remote administrator to invoke the TrustZone-based MDM agents and perform specific management operations. In this work, we design an ARM TrustZone-based network mechanism, called TZNIC, towards enabling resilient and secure access to TrustZone-based software, even in the presence of a malicious rich OS. TZNIC deploys two NIC drivers, one secureworld driver and one normal-world driver, multiplexing one physical NIC. We utilize the ARM TrustZone-based high privilege to protect the secure-world driver and further resolve several challenges on sharing one set of hardware peripherals between two isolated software environments. TZNIC does not require any changes or collaboration of the rich OS. We implement a prototype of TZNIC, and the evaluation results show that TZNIC can provide a reliable network channel to invoke the security software in the secure world, with minimal system overhead on the rich OS. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Mobile and wireless security; Mobile platform security.