This paper presents group key distribution techniques for large and dynamic groups over unreliable channels. The techniques proposed here are based on the self-healing key distribution methods (with revocation capability) recently developed by Staddon et al. [27]. By introducing a novel personal key distribution technique, this paper reduces (1) the communication overhead of personal key share distribution from O(t 2 log q) to O(t log q), (2) the communication overhead of self-healing key distribution with t-revocation capability from O((mt 2 + tm) log q) to O(mt log q), and (3) the storage overhead of the self-healing key distribution with t-revocation capability at each group member from O(m 2 log q) to O(m log q), where t is the maximum number of colluding group members, m is the number of sessions, and q is a prime number that is large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key. All these results are achieved without sacrificing the unconditional security of key distribution. In addition, this paper presents two techniques that allow trade-off between the broadcast size and the recoverability of lost session keys. These two methods further reduce the broadcast message size in situations where there are frequent but short-term disruptions of communication and where there are long-term but infrequent disruptions of communication, respectively.
In wireless sensor networks, clustering sensor nodes into small groups is an effective technique to achieve scalability, self-organization, power saving, channel access, routing, etc. A number of cluster formation protocols have been proposed recently. However, most existing protocols assume benign environments, and are vulnerable to attacks from malicious nodes. In this paper, we propose a secure distributed cluster formation protocol to organize sensor networks into mutually disjoint cliques. Our protocol has the following properties:(1) normal nodes are divided into mutually disjoint cliques;(2) all the normal nodes in each clique agree on the same clique memberships; (3) while external attackers can be prevented from participating in the cluster formation process, inside attackers that do not follow the protocol semantics can be identified and removed from the network; (4) the communication overhead is moderate; (5) the protocol is fully distributed.
Abstract-Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks still pose a significant threat to critical infrastructure and Internet services alike. In this paper, we propose MOTAG, a moving target defense mechanism that secures service access for authenticated clients against flooding DDoS attacks. MOTAG employs a group of dynamic packet indirection proxies to relay data traffic between legitimate clients and the protected servers. Our design can effectively inhibit external attackers' attempts to directly bombard the network infrastructure. As a result, attackers will have to collude with malicious insiders in locating secret proxies and then initiating attacks. However, MOTAG can isolate insider attacks from innocent clients by continuously "moving" secret proxies to new network locations while shuffling client-to-proxy assignments. We develop a greedy shuffling algorithm to minimize the number of proxy re-allocations (shuffles) while maximizing attack isolation. Simulations are used to investigate MOTAG's effectiveness on protecting services of different scales against intensified DDoS attacks.
This paper presents a systematic analysis of insider attacks against mobile ad-hoc routing protocols, using the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol as an example. It identifies a number of attack goals and then studies how to achieve these goals through misuses of the routing messages. To facilitate the analysis, this paper classifies the insider attacks into two categories: atomic misuses and compound misuses. Atomic misuses are performed by manipulating a single routing message, which cannot be further divided; compound misuses are composed of combinations of atomic misuses and possibly normal uses of the routing protocol. The analysis results in this paper reveal several classes of insider attacks, including route disruption, route invasion, node isolation, and resource consumption. This paper also includes simulation results that demonstrate the impact of these attacks.
Recognizing the pressing demands to secure embedded applications, ARM TrustZone has been adopted in both academic research and commercial products to protect sensitive code and data in a privileged, isolated execution environment. However, the design of TrustZone cannot prevent physical memory disclosure attacks such as cold boot attack from gaining unrestricted read access to the sensitive contents in the dynamic random access memory (DRAM). A number of system-on-chip (SoC) bound execution solutions have been proposed to thaw the cold boot attack by storing sensitive data only in CPU registers, CPU cache or internal RAM. However, when the operating system, which is responsible for creating and maintaining the SoC-bound execution environment, is compromised, all the sensitive data is leaked.In this paper, we present the design and development of a cache-assisted secure execution framework, called CaSE, on ARM processors to defend against sophisticated attackers who can launch multi-vector attacks including software attacks and hardware memory disclosure attacks. CaSE utilizes TrustZone and Cache-as-RAM technique to create a cache-based isolated execution environment, which can protect both code and data of security-sensitive applications against the compromised OS and the cold boot attack. To protect the sensitive code and data against cold boot attack, applications are encrypted in memory and decrypted only within the processor for execution. The memory separation and the cache separation provided by TrustZone are used to protect the cached applications against compromised OS.We implement a prototype of CaSE on the i.MX53 running ARM Cortex-A8 processor. The experimental results show that CaSE incurs small impacts on system performance when executing cryptographic algorithms including AES, RSA, and SHA1.
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