Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity

Abstract

Abstract. We present a new remote, coercion-free electronic voting protocol which satisfies a number of properties previously considered contradictory. We introduce (and justify) the idea of revocable anonymity in electronic voting, on the grounds of it being a legal requirement in the United Kingdom, and show a method of proving the validity of a ballot to a verifier in zero knowledge, by extension of known two-candidate proofs.

Towards an Analysis of Verifiable Mix Network Properties

“…In some literatures [8] [23] [20] [21] [22], privacy is often regarded as anonymous. Some others distinguished privacy and anonymity without presented each of their definitions and differences.…”

True Trustworthy Elections: Remote Electronic Voting Using Trusted Computing

“…No work besides our own [30] provides revocable anonymity in electronic voting. Only a small amount of work provides coercion-resistant, remote electronic voting.…”

“…[30] also makes no use of Trusted Computing or the TPM: this limits the amount of trust that can be placed in any remote client. In our work, we present a new approach, which uses the TPM to enhance the trustworthiness of clients, further reducing the need for trust in the talliers.…”

“…In [30], we present a coercion-free remote electronic voting protocol which permits the voter to vote anonymously, whilst maintaining coercion-resistance and voter verifiability, and the ability to revoke her anonymity should the need arise. One of the shortcomings of the protocol is that it requires a certain level of trust in the first set of talliers (viz., that T 1 does not reveal the link between a ballot and its reencryption, only encrypts Alice's identity correctly, and only posts valid ballots to the bulletin board), in order to assure that collaboration between both tallier sets could result in Alice being linked to her ballot only with the cooperation of a judge.…”

“…In the UK, it is a legal requirement that it should be possible for the election authorities to link a ballot to its voter [6, p. 106]. Only we currently consider this notion [30].…”