“Remilitarization,” Really? Assessing Change in Japanese Foreign Security Policy

Hagström, Linus; Williamsson, Jon

doi:10.1080/14799850903178980

Cited by 17 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…This is important for the identification of our models, which include country by industry fixed effects. 2003, and 2007(Hagström and Williamsson, 2009. Finally, France shows a timepattern relatively similar to Germany: The reduction in defense spending after the end of the Cold War is visible, but in contrast to Germany, France did ramp up defense spending after 9/11.…”

Section: Oecd Industry-country Datamentioning

confidence: 95%

The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers

Moretti¹,

Steinwender²

2019

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In the US and many other OECD countries, expenditures for defense-related R&D represent a key policy channel through which governments shape innovation, and dwarf all other public subsidies for innovation. We examine the impact of government funding for R&D-and defense-related R&D in particular-on privately conducted R&D, and its ultimate effect on productivity growth. We estimate models that relate privately funded R&D to lagged government-funded R&D using industry-country level data from OECD countries and firm level data from France. To deal with the potentially endogenous allocation of government R&D funds we use changes in predicted defense R&D as an instrumental variable. In both datasets, we uncover evidence of "crowding in" rather than "crowding out," as increases in government-funded R&D for an industry or a firm result in significant increases in private sector R&D in that industry or firm. A 10% increase in government-financed R&D generates 4.3% additional privately funded R&D. An analysis of wages and employment suggests that the increase in private R&D expenditure reflects actual increases in R&D employment, not just higher labor costs. Our estimates imply that some of the existing crosscountry differences in private R&D investment are due to crosscountry differences in defense R&D expenditures. We also find evidence of international spillovers, as increases in government-funded R&D in a particular industry and country raise private R&D in the same industry in other countries. Finally, we find that increases in private R&D induced by increases in defense R&D result in significant productivity gains.

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Section: Oecd Industry-country Datamentioning

confidence: 95%

The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers

Moretti¹,

Steinwender²

2019

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“…In 2007, the In sum, with the end of the Cold War and through the 1990s and beyond, Japan's security production was higher than any other period of its postwar history. However, it is important not to overstate the magnitude of these changes (Hagström and Williamsson, 2009;Liff, 2015;Midford, 2002, pp. 6-12).…”

Section: Japan In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Anarchic threats and hegemonic assurances: Japan’s security production in the postwar era

Anderson

2016

Int Relat Asia Pac

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What explains Japan's security behavior? As an economically powerful state without commensurate military capabilities, Japan has long puzzled theorists of international relations. To explain this puzzle, many scholars have put forth arguments focusing on Japanese domestic institutions and anti-militarist ideas. In contrast, I argue that Japan's security 'production' is primarily driven by two key variables: the regional threat environment and the strength of security commitment from its ally and great power patron, the United States. These two factors vary and interact in ways that determine Japan's level of security, which drives its security policy. These arguments are illustrated through a longitudinal analysis of Japan's security behavior, comprised of four temporal 'cases' running from 1960 to the present day.

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“…Yet, 20 years later, one can discern more or less change in each of these issue areas ( Hagström and Williamsson, 2009 ).…”

Section: The Tendency: Japan’s ‘Normalisation’ or ‘Remilitarisation’?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, while new goals and problems have been articulated in Japan’s foreign and security policy in the past decades, and more advanced policy instruments have been obtained, these changes have seemed to occur within a hitherto stable core interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and without big shifts in the Japan–US alliance. In other words, since this means that Japan’s international orientation has remained largely intact throughout the post-war period, the interpretation that the country has ‘remilitarised’ does not seem reasonable ( Hagström and Williamsson, 2009 ; cf. Oros, 2007 ; Soeya, 2011 ).…”

Section: The Tendency: Japan’s ‘Normalisation’ or ‘Remilitarisation’?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘abnormal’ state: Identity, norm/exception and Japan

Hagström

2014

European Journal of International Relations

Self Cite

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The term ‘abnormal’ has frequently been used to describe post-war Japan. Together with the idea that the country will, or should have to, ‘normalise’ its foreign and security policy, it has been reproduced in both academia and Japanese society. Why is Japan branded as ‘abnormal’, and from where does the desire to ‘normalise’ it come? Drawing on a relational concept of identity, and the distinction between norm and exception, this article argues that the ‘abnormality–normalisation nexus’ can be understood in terms of three identity-producing processes: (1) the process whereby the Japanese Self is socialised in US/‘Western’ norms, ultimately constructing it as an Other in the international system; (2) the process whereby the Japanese Self imagines itself as ‘legitimately exceptional’ (what is called ‘exceptionalisation’), but also ‘illegitimately abnormal’ — both of which are epitomised by Japan’s ‘pacifism’; and (3) the process whereby both the Self’s ‘negative abnormality’ and China/Asia are securitised in attempts to realise a more ‘normal’ (or super-normal) Japanese Self. How Japan is inter subjectively constructed on a scale between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ enables and constrains action. Although Japan has not remilitarised nearly as much in the 2000s as is often claimed, these processes might very well forebode an exceptional decision to become ‘normal’ and therefore more significant steps towards remilitarisation.

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“Remilitarization,” Really? Assessing Change in Japanese Foreign Security Policy

Cited by 17 publications

References 31 publications

The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers

The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers

Anarchic threats and hegemonic assurances: Japan’s security production in the postwar era

The ‘abnormal’ state: Identity, norm/exception and Japan

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