Rematches in Boxing and Other Sporting Events

Abstract

The authors study the incentive effects of rematches in sports with an emphasis on professional boxing. If the difference between the boxers' abilities is sufficiently small, the authors find that a clause that stipulates that the winner of the fight is obliged to give the loser a rematch (i.e., a mandatory rematch clause) results in a higher aggregate effort compared to aggregate effort when the probability of a rematch depends on effort. This result sheds some light on the practice of offering mandatory rematch clauses to elite boxers. The authors also argue that their results apply to rivalries and rematches in other sporting events and contests.

Corruption on the Court: The Causes and Social Consequences of Point-Shaving in NCAA Basketball

“…As in Amegashie and Kutsoati (2005), we take aggregate match effort as a partial determinant of match excitement and therefore of the demand function. From inequality (14c), it is clear that point-shaving corruption reduces match excitement and, correspondingly, causes a leftward shift in the demand curve for subsequent NCAA basketball games.…”

“…The model shows that point-shaving activities by members of the favored team both decrease aggregate effort and distort relative effort across teams. As in Amegashie and Kutsoati's (2005) analysis of boxing matches, a decrease in aggregate effort in a 1 Wolfers (2006) states that point-shaving usually occurs between gamblers and members of the favored team because players generally compete with a great deal of intensity. Thus, it is much easier to adjust efforts downward.…”

Asymmetric endogenous prize contests

“…In sports contests, larger efforts increase demand for or prize from the contest (see, e.g. Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2005). 1 Military conflicts and lawsuits, on the other hand, are contests in which effort can be destructive.…”

Performance Evaluation and Favoritism

“…Tenorio (2000) examines the incentive effects professional boxing contracts can have on fighter effort. Amegashie and Kutsoati (2005) study the incentive effects of mandatory rematch clauses in boxing on fighter effort, finding that aggregate effort increases when fighters are evenly matched. Balmer, Nevill, and Lane (2005) examine home advantage in European boxing and show that the probability of winning at home increases when the bout goes to a decision versus a knockout.…”