Asymmetric endogenous prize contests

Damianov, Damian S.; Sanders, Shane; Yildizparlak, Anil

doi:10.1007/s11238-018-9661-0

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(49 reference statements)

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“…Adding asymmetry in the market size function would have a similar effect. For example, Damianov, Sanders, and Yildizparlak () look at asymmetric endogenous prize contests with additive production function and logit success function. Second, identifying parameter conditions of the manufacturer's payoff function for advertising goes beyond the scope of this article, but would provide guidelines for more precise decision making.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Manufacturer Advertising Crowd‐in or Crowd‐out Retailer Advertising? An Application of an Endogenous Prize Contest with Asymmetric Players

Ridlon

2016

Southern Economic Journal

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When a manufacturer advertises, what is the impact on retailer advertising? I analyze a contest model of advertising where total advertising by the manufacturer and by retailers determines market size, and the relative level of advertising by each retailer determines market share. If retailers are symmetric I show that there is a crowding-in effect so increased manufacturer advertising increases retail advertising. But if one retailer is stronger, then marginal increases in manufacturer advertising have a crowding-out effect on retailer advertising, while sufficiently large increases have a crowding-in effect by "jump-starting" competition between retailers for the larger market. Furthermore, asymmetric abilities in such contests can lead the weaker player to effectively drop out of the contest, thereby undermining the ability of increased prizes to increase effort by intensifying competition.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Manufacturer Advertising Crowd‐in or Crowd‐out Retailer Advertising? An Application of an Endogenous Prize Contest with Asymmetric Players

Ridlon

2016

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Since 0 < l i < 1, we have y i 0, w i ð Þ. Following Damianov et al (2018), we first show that the equilibrium analysis can be restricted to a game with strategies defined over a compact and convex interval y i , y i h i . The First Order Conditions (FOC) or best-respond function for an interior equilibrium are given by…”

Section: Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since y i ≥ y i > 0, the sharing rule defined in 2 is continuous, and thus the utility u i is continuous. As in Damianov et al (2018), we can apply the extension of Kakutani's (1941) fixed-point theorem which guarantees the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with a compact interval and concave payoff.…”

Section: Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit sharing with a contest among agents

Wang

Zheng

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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We consider how an internal competition in the form of a contest among agents can be combined with profit sharing in team production. The principal can choose to share between the principal and the agents as well as the sharing rule with a competitive contest among the agents. We show that under some conditions, a pure strategy equilibrium of profit sharing exists. In equilibrium, internal sharing involves a contest that is more competitive than proportional sharing, and the principal can get higher profit compared to proportional sharing.

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“…Hodler and Yektaş 2012, for example, use a linear first-price auction with spillovers to model war. 35 Hirai and Szidarovszky 2013 and Damianov et al 2018 consider Tullock contests where the value of the prize depends on the sum of the bids.…”

Section: More Playersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Spillovers

Betto¹,

Thomas²

2021

Preprint

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When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&D races. To understand this influence, we study a general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay contests where we allow for spillovers in each player's reward. The link between participants' efforts and rewards yields novel effectsin particular, players with higher costs and lower values than their opponent sometimes extract larger payoffs.

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Asymmetric endogenous prize contests

Cited by 8 publications

References 39 publications

Does Manufacturer Advertising Crowd‐in or Crowd‐out Retailer Advertising? An Application of an Endogenous Prize Contest with Asymmetric Players

Does Manufacturer Advertising Crowd‐in or Crowd‐out Retailer Advertising? An Application of an Endogenous Prize Contest with Asymmetric Players

Profit sharing with a contest among agents

Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Spillovers

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