Relativizing proportionality to a domain of events

Abstract

A cause is proportional to its effect when, roughly speaking, it is at the right level of detail. There is a lively debate about whether proportionality is a necessary condition for causation. One of the main arguments against a proportionality constraint on causation is that many ordinary and seemingly perfectly acceptable causal claims cite causes that are not proportional to their effects. In this paper, I suggest that proponents of a proportionality constraint can respond to this objection by developing an idea that is present in Yablo’s early work on proportionality, but which has strangely been ignored by both Yablo and others in the subsequent debate. My suggestion is that proportionality—and, indeed, causation itself—is relative to a domain of events. At the metaphysical level, this means that the causal relation has an extra relatum—namely, a domain of events. At the level of language, it introduces a new way in which causal claims are context-sensitive: what is expressed by a causal claim depends on the contextually relevant domain of events. As I argue, this suggestion allows us to accommodate the truth of ordinary causal claims while extending the explanatory benefits of a proportionality constraint.

Proportionality in Causation, Part II: Applications and Challenges

“…The arguments inDasgupta (2014) illustrate the proportionality constraint on metaphysical explanation in action.11Yablo (1992b, p. 423) also invokes the 'unity and integrity of the causal order': the idea that each event should have both many causes and many effects. Taking up one strand of Yablo's (1992b: §11) discussion,Touborg (2022), suggests that the problem of spurious generality may be addressed by relativizing proportionality to a domain of alternative causes.12 Woodward's approach here exemplifies his 'general project of "replacing metaphysics with methodology"' (2016, p. 1057). Blanchard (2020: §4) develops a more concrete interventionist proposal, based on the idea that causal explanations should specify which interventions would prevent the effect.…”

“…11 11 Yablo (1992b, p. 423) also invokes the ‘unity and integrity of the causal order’: the idea that each event should have both many causes and many effects. Taking up one strand of Yablo's (1992b: §11) discussion, Touborg (2022), suggests that the problem of spurious generality may be addressed by relativizing proportionality to a domain of alternative causes. …”

Proportionality in Causation, Part I: Theories

“…3 3 The view is sometimes attributed erroneously to Yablo. For proponents, see also Papineau, 2013, Zhong, 2014, 2022, Franklin‐Hall 2015, Touborg, 2022; McDonald, 2022: ch.5. …”

“…Contrastivists, for example, might view causation as a four-place relation which is unconstrained by proportionality, and yet view proportionality as constraining the truth of causal claims (at least in typical contexts).3 The view is sometimes attributed erroneously to Yablo. For proponents, see alsoPapineau, 2013, Zhong, 2014, Franklin-Hall 2015, Touborg, 2022 McDonald, 2022: ch.5.4 As Schaffer (2005, p. 347) notes, contrastivism may do the work of a fine-grained view. In this case, contrastivists may hold that (1a) and (1b) invoke the same cause but trigger different causal contrasts.5 'To some extent' because one might hold, likeWoodward (2021, p. 364), that all true causal claims are explanatory to some degree, so that 'there is no sharp contrast between causal claims and causal explanations', whilst tying proportionality to degree of explanatoriness.6 This view is also endorsed by McDonnell (2017: §6).7Weslake, 2013 (cf.…”