Cohesive proportionality

Rubenstein, Ezra

doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02069-4

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 28 publications

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“…14 For a general overview of proportionality, see (Rubenstein, 2023a(Rubenstein, , 2023b. 15 For further applications and discussion of proportionality within the SEM framework, see (Franklin-Hall, 2016;Rubenstein, 2024;Woodward, 2010Woodward, , 2018Woodward, , 2021. 16 Though see (McDonald, 2022) for one such attempt.…”

Section: Of 13mentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models

McDonald

2024

Philosophy Compass

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This paper addresses the question of what constitutes an apt interpreted model for the purpose of analyzing causation. I first collect universally adopted aptness principles into a basic account, flagging open questions and choice points along the way. I then explore various additional aptness principles that have been proposed in the literature but have not been widely adopted, the motivations behind their proposals, and the concerns with each that stand in the way of universal adoption. I conclude that the remaining work of articulating aptness for a SEM analysis of causation is tied up with issues to do with modality, ontology, and mereology. Continuing this work is therefore likely to shed light on the relationship between these areas and causation more generally.

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Section: Of 13mentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models

McDonald

2024

Philosophy Compass

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Thing causation

Baron‐Schmitt

2024

Nous

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According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will.

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Cohesive proportionality

Cited by 2 publications

References 28 publications

Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models

Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models

Thing causation

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