Relative political capacity: A dataset to evaluate the performance of nations, 1960–2018

Fisunoğlu, Ali; Kang, Kyungkook; Kugler, Tad; Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Marina

doi:10.1177/07388942221145352

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 63 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The second variable included in the interaction term is an indicator of state capacity . Specifically, I use the new “absolute political capacity” metric developed by Fisunoglu et al (2023). It builds on the classic “relative political capacity” metric (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al 2012) by combining data on both the government’s ability to generate inputs (i.e., absolute extraction capacity, excluding natural resource rents) and the value of its outputs (i.e., life expectancy) 18 .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Violence, Predation, and FDI Entry

Barry

2024

Bus. Polit.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I present a theoretical framework that links different configurations of organized violence to global patterns in foreign direct investment (FDI). Insurgents, states, and rogue government agents all use violence for political purposes (i.e., incapacitating rivals), but they vary in how they use violence for economic purposes (i.e., generating income). Applying Olson’s (1993) concepts of “roving” and “stationary” banditry, I hypothesize that violence perpetrated by rebels and rogue agents indeed depresses a host country’s commercial appeal, but that violence perpetrated willfully by the state doesn’t. This claim is tested against data on FDI “entry” by several thousand multinational corporations between 1994 and 2018.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Violence, Predation, and FDI Entry

Barry

2024

Bus. Polit.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…I include homeland-, host state-, and conflict-related control variables on which to condition my independent variables on diaspora integration. First, I include homeland state capacity, operationalized as relative political extraction (RPE), which evaluates the homeland government’s ability to effectively allocate resources to achieve public goals (Fisunoglu et al, 2011), because militants in strong states are more likely to receive foreign sponsorship (Saideman, 2002). 12 I use the RPE variable appropriate for developing societies, which applies to all homeland economies in the dataset.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivations of diaspora support in homeland civil conflict

Bird

2022

Journal of Peace Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although diasporas often leave their homelands due to violence or political upheaval, these groups may engage in homeland politics by providing financial, material, or diplomatic assistance to militants engaged in civil conflicts. Conversely, diasporas may ignore homeland civil conflicts and exclusively focus on opportunities available in their host states. This study argues that variation in diasporas’ degree of integration into their host states influences whether diasporas support militants opposing homeland governments. Diaspora members may be dissimilated, which undermines their ability to consolidate resources in support of homeland militants, or incorporated, which limits their will to engage in homeland civil conflicts. Moderately integrated diasporas, which maintain identity ties with the homeland and have access to beneficial resources, are most likely to aid militants fighting homeland civil conflicts. Using original data, I test and find support for this integration-based theory.

show abstract

“…Military capacity remains insignificant, also when using total military expenditure as an alternative measurement (SIPRI 2019). I further vary the measurement of bureaucratic capacity, using the Relative Political Capacity (RPC) Dataset, which contains two variables measuring “relative political reach” (Fisunoglu et al 2020, 2). I construct a predictor containing the average value of these two variables, which have been used to proxy bureaucratic capacity in previous research (Hendrix and Young 2014, 341).…”

Section: Extending the Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Armed Conflicts With Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: The Role of Repression and State Capacity

Krause

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What explains the emergence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as parties in civil wars? This study provides the first large-N analysis of this question, studying a sample of states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 2003–2020, contributing to ongoing debates among peace and conflict scholars about jihadist rebels in civil war. Theoretically, it is argued that higher levels of state repression and states’ military capabilities should impact the preferences of local groups and increase the likelihood of a ‘transnationalization’. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that increases in bureaucratic state capacity should reduce the risk of such transnationalization. A series of penalized logistic regressions yield support for the hypotheses regarding state repression and bureaucratic capacity, but not military state capacity. The findings point towards the importance of bureaucratic capacity building as well as the potentially adverse consequences of excessively repressive counterterrorism strategies.

show abstract

Relative political capacity: A dataset to evaluate the performance of nations, 1960–2018

Cited by 7 publications

References 63 publications

Violence, Predation, and FDI Entry

Violence, Predation, and FDI Entry

Motivations of diaspora support in homeland civil conflict

Armed Conflicts With Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: The Role of Repression and State Capacity

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About