Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of<i>Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance</i>

Pohlhaus, Gaile

doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01222.x

Cited by 392 publications

(306 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…[15] In fact, Robinson's case requires the jurors not only to shift their epistemic attention beyond their immediately experienced world, but also to acquire epistemic tools that have been developed specifically in relation to the experienced world of marginalized subjects, revealing this particular case to be one of willful hermeneutical ignorance (see Pohlhaus 2012). [16] It is worth noting that perceiving another in this manner bears a strong resemblance to, if it is not in fact an instance of, what Frye (1983) calls "arrogant perception."…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice

Pohlhaus¹

2013

Social Epistemology

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice

Pohlhaus¹

2013

Social Epistemology

Self Cite

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“…The only way to remedy the situation is for members of dominant groups to enter into dialogue with those who are disadvantaged. The accounts of authors like Medina (2012), Pohlhaus (2012), and Dotson (2012), who emphasise the connections between testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, entail that ending hermeneutical injustice requires the dominant cultural groups to take seriously the testimony of the disadvantaged, and to learn how to use the hermeneutical resources they have developed. The new insight that has emerged from our discussion here, however, is that there are two competing considerations that need to be balanced through dialogue.…”

Section: A Way Forward?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Medina (2012) also makes this same point. Pohlhaus (2012) likewise focuses on situations where the disadvantaged group has the hermeneutical resources needed to understand their experiences, which are missing from the stock of meanings possessed by the dominant group(s). She suggests that in some such cases, the latter is not simply unaware of the disadvantaged group's view of things, but actively refuses to listen and so learn from them.…”

Section: Hermeneutical Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

Hermeneutical Injustice and the Problem of Authority

Romdenh‐Romluc

2017

fpq

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In this paper, I discuss a problem for Miranda Fricker's notion of 'hermeneutical injustice'-harm done to a social group by the fact that their culture's shared hermeneutical resources are skewed towards the experiences of its more powerful members. The problem I raise here is revealed when we consider how to remedy these hermeneutical wrongs. Fricker characterizes hermeneutical injustice as involving a lack of concepts. But what has not been properly appreciated in the literature to date is that it is really competing views of the world that are at stake. Fricker's account then seems to imply that the disadvantaged group's understanding of the world (or at least that bit of it, where their understanding is contested by the dominant group, and where that difference in interpretation is harmful to the disadvantaged group) should be treated as authoritative, and taken up by the wider culture. The worry is that, in some cases, the disadvantaged group's view of things is not one that we think should be accepted. Having presented this problem, I will then show that it bears some similarities to another debate: the dispute over feminist critiques of alien cultural practices. I will then argue that lessons drawn from the latter can help overcome the problem of authority in Fricker's case.

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“…[...] Strong objectivity requires that we investigate the relation between subject and object rather than deny the existence of, or seek unilateral control over, this relation (Harding 1991: 151-152, see also Smith 1974, Haraway 1988, Harding 1993, Pohlhaus 2012.…”

Section: Three Phases and Three Literaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uses of the Self: Two Ways of Thinking about Scholarly Situatedness and Method

Neumann

2015

Millennium

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If the scholarly self is irretrievably tied to the world, then self-situating is a fruitful source of data production. The researcher becomes a producer, as opposed to a collector, of data. This how-to paper identifies three analytical stages where such self-situating takes place. Pre-field; there is autobiographical situating; in-field, there is field situating, and post-field, there is textual situating. Each of these stages are presented in terms of the three literatures that have done the most work on them --feminism, Gestalt, and poststructuralism -and a number of how-to examples. We illustrate with a number of how-to examples. In conclusion, we discuss how two different methodological commitments to situatedness, which Jackson (2010) dubbed reflexivist and analyticist, give rise to two analytically distinct ways of using the scholarly self for data production. Reflexivists and analyticists approach data production from opposite ends of the researcher/informant relationship. Where a reflexivist researcher tends to handle the relation between interlocutor and researcher by asking how interlocutors affect her, an analyticist researcher tends to ask how the researcher affects them.

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Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory ofWillful Hermeneutical Ignorance

Cited by 392 publications

References 8 publications

Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice

Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice

Hermeneutical Injustice and the Problem of Authority

Uses of the Self: Two Ways of Thinking about Scholarly Situatedness and Method

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