Reintegrating the Study of Accuracy Into Social Cognition Research

Zaki, Jamil; Ochsner, Kevin N.

doi:10.1080/1047840x.2011.551743

Cited by 117 publications

(132 citation statements)

References 269 publications

(212 reference statements)

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“…The finding that people can accurately predict the intensity of their feelings about events has important implications (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). It is widely accepted, as reflected in the research literature (e.g., Gilbert, Morwedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004;Wilson et al, 2000), media reports (e.g., Gertner, 2003), and coverage of social psychology in modern textbooks (e.g., Gleitman, Reisberg, & Gross, 2010), that people can anticipate the valence of their emotional response to events but overestimate both emotional intensity and duration.…”

Section: People Can Accurately Predict the Intensity Of Their Feelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy and artifact: Reexamining the intensity bias in affective forecasting.

Levine

Lench

Kaplan

et al. 2012

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

168

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Research on affective forecasting shows that people have a robust tendency to overestimate the intensity of future emotion. We hypothesized that (a) people can accurately predict the intensity of their feelings about events and (b) a procedural artifact contributes to people's tendency to overestimate the intensity of their feelings in general. People may misinterpret the forecasting question as asking how they will feel about a focal event, but they are later asked to report their feelings in general without reference to that event. In the current investigation, participants predicted and reported both their feelings in general and their feelings about an election outcome (Study 1) and an exam grade (Study 3). We also assessed how participants interpreted forecasting questions (Studies 2 and 4) and conducted a meta-analysis of affective forecasting research (Study 5). The results showed that participants accurately predicted the intensity of their feelings about events. They overestimated only when asked to predict how they would feel in general and later report their feelings without reference to the focal event. Most participants, however, misinterpreted requests to predict their feelings in general as asking how they would feel when they were thinking about the focal event. Clarifying the meaning of the forecasting question significantly reduced overestimation. These findings reveal that people have more sophisticated self-knowledge than is commonly portrayed in the affective forecasting literature. Overestimation of future emotion is partly due to a procedure in which people predict one thing but are later asked to report another.

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Section: People Can Accurately Predict the Intensity Of Their Feelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy and artifact: Reexamining the intensity bias in affective forecasting.

Levine

Lench

Kaplan

et al. 2012

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

168

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Furthermore, the abovementioned indirect mentalizing tasks only assess implicit processes in terms of how participants respond to other minds and ignore how well they understand those minds. The accuracy of such implicit processes, however, is important, as the goal of everyday social cognition is to draw accurate inferences to guide social behavior (Zaki and Ochsner 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approximating Implicit and Explicit Mentalizing with Two Naturalistic Video-Based Tasks in Typical Development and Autism Spectrum Disorder

Rosenblau

Kliemann

Heekeren

et al. 2014

J Autism Dev Disord

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Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been proposed to show greater impairments in implicit than explicit mentalizing. To test this proposition, we developed two comparable naturalistic tasks for a performance-based approximation of implicit and explicit mentalizing in 28 individuals with ASD and 23 matched typically developed (TD) participants. Although both tasks were sensitive to the social impairments of individuals with ASD, implicit mentalizing was not more dysfunctional than explicit mentalizing. In TD participants, performance on the tasks did not correlate with each other, whereas in individuals with ASD they were highly correlated. These findings suggest that implicit and explicit mentalizing processes are separable in typical development. In contrast, in individuals with ASD implicit and explicit mentalizing processes are similarly impaired and closely linked suggesting a lack of developmental specification of these processes in ASD.

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“…In contrast, affective empathy refers to relatively automatic experience sharing processes through which observed actions and social/emotional cues trigger a shared neural response in the observer. These sub-processes involve separate neural systems and adaptive empathic responding is believed to involve coordinated interaction between them (Zaki and Ochsner, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pain empathy in schizophrenia: an fMRI study

Horan

Jimenez

Lee

et al. 2016

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

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Although it has been proposed that schizophrenia is characterized by impaired empathy, several recent studies found intact neural responses on tasks measuring the affective subdomain of empathy. This study further examined affective empathy in 21 schizophrenia outpatients and 21 healthy controls using a validated pain empathy paradigm with two components: (i) observing videos of people described as medical patients who were receiving a painful sound stimulation treatment; (ii) listening to the painful sounds (to create regions of interest). The observing videos component incorporated experimental manipulations of perspective taking (instructions to imagine 'Self' vs 'Other' experiencing pain) and cognitive appraisal (information about whether treatment was 'Effective' vs 'Not Effective'). When considering activation across experimental conditions, both groups showed similar dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior insula (AI) activation while merely observing others in pain. However, there were group differences associated with perspective taking: controls showed relatively greater dACC and AI activation for the Self vs Other contrast whereas patients showed relatively greater activation in these and additional regions for the Other vs Self contrast. Although patients demonstrated grossly intact neural activity while observing others in pain, they showed more subtle abnormalities when required to toggle between imagining themselves vs others experiencing pain.

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Reintegrating the Study of Accuracy Into Social Cognition Research

Cited by 117 publications

References 269 publications

Accuracy and artifact: Reexamining the intensity bias in affective forecasting.

Accuracy and artifact: Reexamining the intensity bias in affective forecasting.

Approximating Implicit and Explicit Mentalizing with Two Naturalistic Video-Based Tasks in Typical Development and Autism Spectrum Disorder

Pain empathy in schizophrenia: an fMRI study

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