Our purpose in the present meta-analysis was to examine the extent to which discrete emotions elicit changes in cognition, judgment, experience, behavior, and physiology; whether these changes are correlated as would be expected if emotions organize responses across these systems; and which factors moderate the magnitude of these effects. Studies (687; 4,946 effects, 49,473 participants) were included that elicited the discrete emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, and anxiety as independent variables with adults. Consistent with discrete emotion theory, there were (a) moderate differences among discrete emotions; (b) differences among discrete negative emotions; and (c) correlated changes in behavior, experience, and physiology (cognition and judgment were mostly not correlated with other changes). Valence, valence-arousal, and approach-avoidance models of emotion were not as clearly supported. There was evidence that these factors are likely important components of emotion but that they could not fully account for the pattern of results. Most emotion elicitations were effective, although the efficacy varied with the emotions being compared. Picture presentations were overall the most effective elicitor of discrete emotions. Stronger effects of emotion elicitations were associated with happiness versus negative emotions, self-reported experience, a greater proportion of women (for elicitations of happiness and sadness), omission of a cover story, and participants alone versus in groups. Conclusions are limited by the inclusion of only some discrete emotions, exclusion of studies that did not elicit discrete emotions, few available effect sizes for some contrasts and moderators, and the methodological rigor of included studies.

Boredom is frequently considered inconsequential and has received relatively little research attention. We argue that boredom has important implications for human functioning, based on emotion theory and empirical evidence. Specifically, we argue that boredom motivates pursuit of new goals when the previous goal is no longer beneficial. Exploring alternate goals and experiences allows the attainment of goals that might be missed if people fail to reengage. Similar to other discrete emotions, we propose that boredom has specific and unique impacts on behavior, cognition, experience and physiology. Consistent with a broader argument that boredom encourages the behavioral pursuit of alternative goals, we argue that, while bored, attention to the current task is reduced, the experience of boredom is negative and aversive, and that boredom increases autonomic arousal to ready the pursuit of alternatives. By motivating desire for change from the current state, boredom increases opportunities to attain social, cognitive, emotional and experiential stimulation that could have been missed. We review the limited extant literature to support these claims, and call for more experimental boredom research.

The authors address conceptual and methodological foundations of incremental validity in the evaluation of newly developed clinical assessment measures. Incremental validity is defined as the degree to which a measure explains or predicts a phenomenon of interest, relative to other measures. Incremental validity can be evaluated on several dimensions, such as sensitivity to change, diagnostic efficacy, content validity, treatment design and outcome, and convergent validity. Indices of incremental validity can vary depending on the criterion measures, comparison measures, and individual differences in samples. The authors review the rationale for, principles, and methods of incremental validation, including the selection of comparison and criterion measures, and address data analytic strategies and the conditional nature of incremental validity evaluations in the selection of measures. Incremental validity contributes to, but is different from, cost-benefits, which reflect the cost of acquiring the data and the benefits from the data. The impact of an incremental validity index on whether a measure is selected will be moderated by the cost of acquiring the new data, the importance of the measured phenomenon, and the clinical utility of the new data.

Research on affective forecasting shows that people have a robust tendency to overestimate the intensity of future emotion. We hypothesized that (a) people can accurately predict the intensity of their feelings about events and (b) a procedural artifact contributes to people's tendency to overestimate the intensity of their feelings in general. People may misinterpret the forecasting question as asking how they will feel about a focal event, but they are later asked to report their feelings in general without reference to that event. In the current investigation, participants predicted and reported both their feelings in general and their feelings about an election outcome (Study 1) and an exam grade (Study 3). We also assessed how participants interpreted forecasting questions (Studies 2 and 4) and conducted a meta-analysis of affective forecasting research (Study 5). The results showed that participants accurately predicted the intensity of their feelings about events. They overestimated only when asked to predict how they would feel in general and later report their feelings without reference to the focal event. Most participants, however, misinterpreted requests to predict their feelings in general as asking how they would feel when they were thinking about the focal event. Clarifying the meaning of the forecasting question significantly reduced overestimation. These findings reveal that people have more sophisticated self-knowledge than is commonly portrayed in the affective forecasting literature. Overestimation of future emotion is partly due to a procedure in which people predict one thing but are later asked to report another.

The facial feedback hypothesis suggests that an individual’s experience of emotion is influenced by feedback from their facial movements. To evaluate the cumulative evidence for this hypothesis, we conducted a meta-analysis on 286 effect sizes derived from 138 studies that manipulated facial feedback and collected emotion self-reports. Using random effects meta-regression with robust variance estimates, we found that the overall effect of facial feedback was significant but small. Results also indicated that feedback effects are stronger in some circumstances than others. We examined 12 potential moderators, and 3 were associated with differences in effect sizes: (a) Type of emotional outcome: Facial feedback influenced emotional experience (e.g., reported amusement) and, to a greater degree, affective judgments of a stimulus (e.g., the objective funniness of a cartoon). Three publication bias detection methods did not reveal evidence of publication bias in studies examining the effects of facial feedback on emotional experience, but all 3 methods revealed evidence of publication bias in studies examining affective judgments. (b) Presence of emotional stimuli: Facial feedback effects on emotional experience were larger in the absence of emotionally evocative stimuli (e.g., cartoons). (c) Type of stimuli: When participants were presented with emotionally evocative stimuli, facial feedback effects were larger in the presence of some types of stimuli (e.g., emotional sentences) than others (e.g., pictures). The available evidence supports the facial feedback hypothesis’ central claim that facial feedback influences emotional experience, although these effects tend to be small and heterogeneous.