Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

Malsch, Bertrand; Gendron, Yves

doi:10.1016/j.aos.2011.06.001

Cited by 158 publications

(206 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Academic inquiry could shed light on the individual histories of accounting OBs in various national contexts, with particular emphasis on their actual performance and impact on the quality of financial reporting and auditing (Arnold, 2012;Malsch & Gendron, vs. common law legal systems) and, more generally, historically-rooted modes of regulation (Puxty et al, 1987), warrant examination for their relationship to the efficacy of emerging oversight institutions. Another issue requiring academic attention is the position of the global profession and key international audit firms regarding regulatory reforms in the EU and US, and the ensuing spread of national OBs across the globe.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under such conditions, tightening regulation or introducing more structural changes has been a state's main response to crisis at various times and locales (Hancher & Moran, 1989;Malsch & Gendron, 2011;Zeff, 2003). Indeed, a senior public servant has linked the establishment of ELTE with the ASE affair, suggesting that the creation of the Greek OB "was apparently brought forward by the scandal" (interview, 26 September 2013).…”

Section: The Local Politico-economic and Professional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Malsch & Gendron, 2011) on several fronts. First, our paper employs O'Donnell's theoretical conception of delegative democracies within a broader political economy framework to create the theoretical backdrop for investigating how local socio-political constraints condition the establishment and operation of an imported institution -a subject that is currently high on the global agenda.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Malsch & Gendron, 2011;Zeff, 2003). In the past two decades of advancing globalization, reforms in the accounting domain have taken place within what Wade (2007a) calls the Standards-Surveillance-Compliance (SSC) doctrine, a regulatory framework of globally-integrated financial markets that aims to provide stability in the marketplace (Βüthe & Mattli, 2011;Davies & Green, 2008;Wade, 2007aWade, , 2007b.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) serve as a basic mechanism for tackling perennial problems in corporate financial reporting and auditing, within the broader complex and hierarchical global regulatory system (Arnold, 2012;Humphrey et al, 2009;Wade, 2007a). OBs emerged in the US under the SarbanesOxley Act (US Congress, 2002), in the EU under the (new) Eighth Directive (European Commission, 2006), and in other countries (Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Their establishment rests on the assumption that they can operate efficiently and effectively to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help to restore the trust of investors and the public (European Commission, 2001aUS Congress, 2002.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

Caramanis

Dedoulis

Leventis

2015

Accounting, Organizations and Society

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The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Local Politico-economic and Professional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

Caramanis

Dedoulis

Leventis

2015

Accounting, Organizations and Society

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In Support of Public or Private Interests? An Examination of Sanctions Imposed Under the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct

2016

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Whistle-blowing by external auditors: Seeking legitimacy for the South African Audit Profession?

Maroun

Solomon

2014

Accounting Forum

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Auditing is often cited as playing an important role in managing agency-related costs and, accordingly, being integral to the sound functioning of capital markets. There may, however, be more to the attest function than simply a technical rational practice. By virtue of relying heavily on claims to technical expertise, professionalism, prudential judgement and public confidence auditing is both a source of legitimacy for organisations while, paradoxically, dependent on claims to legitimacy for its own continued existence. From this perspective, recent regulatory developments purportedly enacted to increase arms length control over the profession may not only be about improving perceived audit quality and practice but also about ensuring continued faith in the well-established 'rituals' of the assurance function. A reporting duty imposed on South African external auditors, akin to whistle-blowing, is used as a case study to explore this perspective. In doing so, this paper contributes to the scant body of interpretive research on auditing simultaneously offering one of the first insights into auditing regulation form an African perspective.

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Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

Cited by 158 publications

References 40 publications

Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

In Support of Public or Private Interests? An Examination of Sanctions Imposed Under the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct

Whistle-blowing by external auditors: Seeking legitimacy for the South African Audit Profession?

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