His research focus is on accounting disclosure and quality, auditing, banking and corporate social responsibility. He has published work in a number of international scientific journals. He serves on the editorial boards of international journals such as Accounting and Business Research and Corporate Governance: An International Review.

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Research question: European football clubs are known for an institutionalized management culture which prioritizes on-field success over financial performance. This creates an extremely competitive context within which most clubs operate, producing debts and deficits. However, in order to secure clubs' long-term financial viability, Union of European Football Association (UEFA) has introduced regulatory and monitoring processes tied to accounting data in order to assess clubs' financial performance. This study aims to determine whether UEFA's framework has an impact on clubs' management policies with regard to accounting quality. Research methods:The study employs a sample of 109 European football clubs for a seven-year period, 2008-2014 (three years before and four years after the regulatory intervention), to investigate the impact of the reform upon management practices related to accounting. Following prior literature, we employ the three most commonly used proxies of accounting quality: earnings management, conditional accounting conservatism and auditor switching. Results and findings: This study demonstrates that, at the expense of accounting quality, club management seeks to promote the image of a financially robust organization in order to secure licensing and, consequently, much needed funding from UEFA. In this manner, the dominance of a management culture which impairs financial performance is further cemented. Implications: UEFA should take into consideration that, in a financially distressed industry focused on achieving success on the field of play, the imposition of regulatory monitoring tied to accounting data inevitably leads to a loss of organizational credibility and transparency. Hence, UEFA's intervention should be accompanied by the imposition of a corporate governance framework which would aim to rearrange club management priorities by facilitating a change in institutionalized mentalities. ARTICLE HISTORY

The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Research Question/Issue Over the last decades, research on the relationship between national institutions, governance mechanisms, and firm outcomes has been increasing. This review aims at (i) analyzing extant research in this area, (ii) identifying influential current trends, and (iii) highlighting future avenues of research. Research Findings/Insights Using a content analysis of 165 articles published in top journals from accounting, finance, management, and organization disciplines, we explore research on institutions, corporate governance, and firm outcomes. Our results show that stronger national institutions aimed at protecting investors are mostly associated with better corporate governance and firm financial outcomes and that these relationships are moderated by some contingency factors. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings encourage scholars to further explore the relationship between national institutions, corporate governance, and firm outcomes by using theoretical frameworks and methods allowing them (i) to develop a “thicker” understanding of the national institutional context, (ii) to analyze powerful stakeholders' influence on the above relationships, and (iii) to better understand the role played by informal institutions. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our findings help policymakers and investors to (i) better understand how national institutions impact on both governance mechanisms and firm outcomes and (ii) develop policies or design governance mechanisms taking into consideration country‐, industry‐, and firm‐level contingencies.

In this paper we provide evidence for the effects of social norms on audit pricing by studying companies belonging to the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries, which are often described as "sin" companies. We hypothesize that the disparities between "sin" firms operations and prevailing social norms create an adverse context which heightens the client's business risk assessment by auditors and is, thereby, reflected in the pricing decisions for audit and consulting services. Having controlled for the impact of variables relating to client attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes, we demonstrate that audit firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. Additionally, we show that audit pricing levels within the "sin" group depend both on prevailing political views and on the level of "vice" exhibited by "sin" companies.