Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

Crocker, Keith J.; Masten, Scott E.

doi:10.1007/bf00134817

Cited by 155 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 71 publications

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“…Market governance has the letter of the contract as the main source for solving conflicts, that is, the classical contract law, where formal terms overlaps less formal terms (Spinelli & Birley, 1996). Hierarchy governance relies on the control over the use and disposition of assets, that is, ownership and integration in the same organization (Crocker & Masten, 1996). Finally, hybrid governance is associated to parties that maintain autonomy but are interdependent, which is the form of governance in franchising contracts.…”

Section: Transaction-cost Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution in franchising: Trends and new perspectives

Varotto

Aureliano-Silva

2017

Internext

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The Singer Company established a network of resellers for sewing machines. Nowadays franchising is one of the fastest developing forms of business in the world. The evolution of theories that seek to explain franchise systems have been published in academic journals from time to time, but until now there was not a study that have established a social network analysis to quantify the degree of centrality and cohesion of the relationship between the main authors, journals, methods and theories in franchise. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to extend the knowledge about franchising through an extensive research on its main theoretical perspectives into relevant international academic journals, showing the evolution of the field, highlighting the principal issues, authors and methods. Through a selection of 130 articles ranging from 1966 to 2015 the study investigates five relevant theories in franchising: (1) Resource Acquisition Theory, (2) Agency Theory, (3) Transaction Cost Analysis, (4) Signaling Theory, and (5) Property Rights Theory. A descriptive statistical analysis was done in order to identify the main authors and trends with the most used associated theories in franchise papers. The findings show agency theory and signaling theory, and resource scarcity theory as the main perspectives used in studies about franchising, but other perspectives have been increasing its presence, mainly the institutional theory and resource based-view perspective. The main dependent and independent variables cover a wide range of constructs, but ownership, performance, age, size, growth, geographical dispersion, and internationalization have been the most cited.

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Section: Transaction-cost Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution in franchising: Trends and new perspectives

Varotto

Aureliano-Silva

2017

Internext

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“…This reform has been grounded in institutional economic theory. Several studies have examined public-private partnerships involving concessions, leases or management contracts for the provision of utilities, education or health care from such differing theoretical perspectives as transaction cost economics (Crocker and Masten, 1996;Huet and Saussier, 2003), or agency theory (Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2003). The development of partnerships with the private sector has emerged as a key element in implementing public policies and programs.…”

Section: Fig 1 Howard's Three Magnetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Ways of New Towns Development: A Tale of Two Cities

Insa-Ciriza¹

2012

Urban Development

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“…Since these classic studies, numerous studies in industrial organization and regulation (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 1996;Saussier, 2000), alliance organization (Dyer, 1997), international business ( and marketing (e.g., Anderson, 1985;Heide and John, 1988) have examined the impact of human capital specificity on governance and contractual choice. Most confirm the TCE prediction(s).…”

Section: Empirical Applicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Capital and Transaction Cost Economics

Foss

2011

The Oxford Handbook of Human Capital

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Human capital (HC) may be defined as the stock of valued skills, knowledge, insights, and so on, controlled by an individual: the attributes of the relevant individual that are valuable in an economic context. It yields services such as labour services, management services, or entrepreneurship. While this overall perspective cuts across organizational economics perspectives – such as transaction-cost economics (TCE), property rights/incomplete contracts theory, and agency theory – the specific terminology applied here is particular to TCE. This article surveys TCE as it pertains to HC, concentrating on: the work of TCE's most prominent flag-bearer, Oliver Williamson; the precursors of his work; and the various operationalizations and extensions of his approach. Also briefly discussed is the property-rights approach, which, like TCE, rests on the notion of incomplete contracting and the need to safeguard transactions under such conditions.

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Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

Cited by 155 publications

References 71 publications

Evolution in franchising: Trends and new perspectives

Evolution in franchising: Trends and new perspectives

Two Ways of New Towns Development: A Tale of Two Cities

Human Capital and Transaction Cost Economics

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