In this paper, we take our theoretical point of departure in recent work in organisational economics on systems of human resource management (HRM) practices. We develop the argument that just as complementarities between new HRM practices influence financial performance positively, there are theoretical reasons for expecting them also to influence innovation performance positively. We examine this overall hypothesis by estimating an empirical model of innovation performance, using data from a Danish survey of 1,900 business firms. Using principal component analysis, we identify two HRM systems which are conducive to innovation. In the first one, seven of our nine HRM variables matter (almost) equally for the ability to innovate. The second system is dominated by firm-internal and firm-external training. Of the total of nine sectors that we consider, we find that the four manufacturing sectors correlate with the first system. Firms belonging to wholesale trade and to the ICT intensive service sectors tend to be associated with the second system.

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The ‘knowledge governance approach’ is characterized as a distinctive, emerging approach that cuts across the fields of knowledge management, organization studies, strategy and human resource management. Knowledge governance is taken up with how the deployment of governance mechanisms influences knowledge processes, such as sharing, retaining and creating knowledge. It insists on clear micro (behavioural) foundations, adopts an economizing perspective, and examines the links between knowledge-based units of analysis with diverse characteristics and governance mechanisms with diverse capabilities of handling these transactions. Research issues that the knowledge governance approach illuminates are sketched.

Micro-foundations have become an important emerging theme in strategic management. This paper addresses micro-foundations in two related ways. First, we argue that the kind of macro (or "collectivist") explanation that is utilized in the capabilities view in strategic management ⎯ which implies a neglect of micro-foundations ⎯ is incomplete. There are no mechanisms that work solely on the macro-level, directly connecting routines and capabilities to firm-level outcomes. While routines and capabilities are useful shorthand for complicated patterns of individual action and interaction, ultimately they are best understood at the micro-level. Second, we provide a formal model that shows precisely why macro explanation is incomplete and which exemplifies how explicit micro-foundations may be built for notions of routines and capabilities and for how these impact firm performance.

Research highlights the role of external knowledge sources in the recognition of strategic opportunities, but is less forthcoming with respect to the role of such sources during the process of exploiting or realizing opportunities. We build on the knowledge-based view to propose that realizing opportunities often involves significant interactions with external knowledge sources. Organizational design can facilitate a firm's interactions with these sources, while achieving coordination among organizational members engaged in opportunity exploitation. Our analysis of a double-respondent survey involving 536 Danish firms shows that the use of external knowledge sources is positively associated with opportunity exploitation, but the strength of this association is significantly influenced by organizational designs that enable the firm to access external knowledge during the process of exploiting opportunities.

This article maintains that the consistent application of subjectivism helps reconcile contemporary entrepreneurship theory with the strategic management literature, particularly the resource-based view of the fi rm. The article synthesizes theoretical insights from Austrian economics, Penrose's (1959) resources approach, and modern resource-based theory, focusing on the essential subjectivity of the entrepreneurial process. This new synthesis describes entrepreneurship as a creative team act in which heterogeneous managerial mental models interact to create and arrange resources to produce a collective output that is creatively superior to individual output.

It is argued that Kogut and Zander (Kogut, B., U. Zander. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of technology. Organ. Sci. 3 383–397.) and Conner (Conner, K. R. 1991. A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of thought within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the firm? J. Management 17 121–154.) erred in the specific way in which they claimed that a distinct theory of the multi-person firm can be constructed on the basis of a theory of organizational knowledge or from resource-based insights. It is not possible to tell very much of a story about why there should be firms in lieu of notions such as “opportunism” or “moral hazard.” However, properly interpreted, knowledge-based theories may help shed light on issues relating to the boundaries and internal organization of the firm.

Infusing hierarchies with elements of market control has become a much-used way of simultaneously increasing entrepreneurialism and motivation in firms. However, this paper argues that such "internal hybrids," particularly in their radical forms, are inherently hard to successfully design and implement because of a fundamental incentive problem of establishing credible managerial commitments to not intervene in delegated decision making. This theme is developed and illustrated, using the case of the world-leading hearing aids producer, Oticon. In the beginning of the 1990s, Oticon became famous for its radical internal hybrid, the "spaghetti organization." Recent work has interpreted the spaghetti organization as a radical attempt to foster dynamic capabilities by organizational means, neglecting, however, that about a decade later the spaghetti organization has given way to a more traditional matrix organization. In contrast, an organizational economics interpretation of Oticon organizational changes is developed. This lens suggests that a strong liability of the spaghetti organization was the above incentive problem: Frequent managerial meddling with delegated rights led to a severe loss of motivation, and arguably caused the change to a more structured organization. Refutable implications are developed, and the discussion is broadened to more general issues of economic organization.