Recent studies provide evidence that income inequality is a relevant driver for the electoral success of populist parties all over Europe. In this article, we aim to understand how exactly increasing income inequality can lead to support for populist parties. More specifically, we discuss four different attitudinal mechanisms from previous research: economic insecurities, trust in political elites, social integration, and national identity. We rely on eight waves of the European Social Survey and find that economic insecurities, trust in political elites, and national identity are linked to rising income inequality and populist support as expected. However, a causal mediation analysis shows that these mechanisms are not sufficient to fully understand the impact of income inequality on support for populists. This finding raises questions regarding the empirical support of existing theories to explain how macroeconomic changes in inequality became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties.
KEYWORDS Income inequality; populism; political parties; voting decisionsMost democratic societies have experienced a rapid increase in income inequalities over the last decades. Across OECD countries the average share of disposable income that is earned by the top 10% earners has increased and is now around 9.5 times higher than the income of the bottom 10%. In the same period, liberal democracies find themselves challenged by populist parties, which separate society into two homogeneous groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' and who want to implement the general will of the people irrespective of existing liberal democratic institutions. While mainstream parties suffer dramatic electoral losses, right-wing and left-wing populist parties are on the rise all over Europe (Spoon & Klüver, 2019). In 1990 populist parties received around 10% of the vote in democracies, in 2016 they received around 25% of the votes.