Reflexivity, Relativism, Microhistory: Three Desiderata for Historical Epistemologies

Kusch, Martin

doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9336-5

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…They find it hard to see how D&G's explanation of the unity of objectivity in terms of a complementary scientific self could ever be genuinely explanatory (e.g. Kusch 2009Kusch , 2011Dear et al 2012). I am inclined to agree, but my aim here is to show that D&G run into trouble even we remain neutral, for the moment, on the possibility that their account of explanation might work.…”

Section: The Disunity Of Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 89%

Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy

Witteveen

2017

Erkenn

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In Objectivity (2007), Daston and Galison argue that scientific objectivity has a history. Objectivity emerged as a distinct nineteenth-century ''epistemic virtue,'' flanked in time by other epistemic virtues. The authors trace the origins of scientific objectivity by identifying changes in images from scientific atlases from different periods, but they emphasize that the same history could be narrated using different sorts of scientific objects. One could, for example, focus on the changing uses of ''type specimens'' in biological taxonomy. Daston (Crit Inq 31(1): 2004) indeed provides a detailed account of the history of the type specimen which purports to show this. I argue that this attempt hinges on a conceptual confusion and therefore fails. I show that the actual history of the type specimen does not reinforce the account of epistemic virtues from Objectivity, but rather threatens to subvert it.

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Section: The Disunity Of Objectivitymentioning

confidence: 89%

Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy

Witteveen

2017

Erkenn

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“…Por su parte, Kusch (2008Kusch ( y 2010 ha insistido en que efectivamente el trabajo de estilos de Hacking nos remite a la epistemología histórica, porque es a la vez un proyecto histórico y filosófico, ya que historiza lo que cuenta como razón, como proposición científica y como entidad científica. Las críticas que Kusch le ha planteado a Hacking pueden ser un sustento para complejizar el proyecto de estilos de razonamiento y, así, éste podría jugar un papel central en el programa de EHCEP que aquí se sugiere.…”

Section: Histórica?unclassified

“…Recientemente, Martin Kusch (2008Kusch ( y 2010 ha sugerido que la propuesta de Hacking sobre estilos de razonamiento debe verse como un proyecto de epistemología histórica. Sin embargo, cabe señalar que Kusch ha hecho críticas importantes a Hacking, objeciones que analizaremos a profundidad en este trabajo.…”

Section: Introducción Generalunclassified

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Las relaciones entre estilos de razonamiento y prácticas científicas como eje central de un proyecto de epistemología histórica

Moreno¹,

Alejandro²

2012

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Este trabajo está dedicado a las dos personas más importantes de mi vida. A mi madre, Amparo Moreno, a quien tanto debo, y a Isabel González, quien desde hace 20 años ha compartido conmigo sueños y realidades, alegrías y tristezas, utopías y desesperanzas…en fin, ha entrelazado su existencia con la mía. Sin ellas no hubiesen llegado a buen puerto los proyectos que he emprendido, ni me hubiese levantado de las derrotas que he vivido.

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“…Things get complicated here, because at least one other version of historical epistemology, namely that of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, is about what Hacking calls ''historical ontology'', or the history of objects of science. It suffices to note these terminological juxtapositions; from now on, I shall ignore them (a few reasons for considering Hacking an historical epistemologist can be found in Kusch 2011). situation. Rather, they are empirical theories about stages and mechanisms in the development of human cognitive abilities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment

Sturm

2011

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This essay aims to sharpen debates on the pros and cons of historical epistemology, which is now understood as a novel approach to the study of knowledge, by comparing it with the history of epistemology as traditionally pursued by philosophers. The many versions of both approaches are not always easily discernable. Yet, a reasoned comparison of certain versions can and should be made. In the first section of this article, I argue that the most interesting difference involves neither the subject matter nor goal, but the methods used by the two approaches. In the second section, I ask which of the two approaches or methods is more promising given that both historical epistemologists and historians of epistemology claim to contribute to epistemology simpliciter. Using traditional problems concerning the epistemic role of perception, I argue that the historical epistemologies of Wartofsky and Daston and Galison fail to show that studying practices of perception is philosophically significant. Standard methods from the history of epistemology are more promising, as I show by means of reconstructing arguments in a debate about the relation between perception and judgment in psychological research on the famous moon illusion.

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Reflexivity, Relativism, Microhistory: Three Desiderata for Historical Epistemologies

Cited by 15 publications

References 17 publications

Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy

Objectivity, Historicity, Taxonomy

Las relaciones entre estilos de razonamiento y prácticas científicas como eje central de un proyecto de epistemología histórica

Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment

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