Reflections From China on Xi Jinping's “Asia for Asians”

Abstract

Internal debates continue in China and abroad about the meaning and significance of Chinese President Xi Jinping's position on a new Asian regional security order. Some observers insist that a strongly worded May 2014 speech Xi delivered in Shanghai reflects China's intensified determination to exercise an increasingly assertive posture toward the United States. Others suspect that such rhetoric is largely designed for internal consumption to appeal to nationalist sentiments about the need for China to stand up to the United States and take a leadership role in the region. Such differences in interpretation are extended to discussions about China's attitudes toward the United States’ continued strategic presence in Asia and about Washington's maintenance of its long‐standing alliance network there. The truth is that a combination of Chinese aspirations for shaping a new regional security architecture tempered by the realities and constraints of what China can actually do at this point in time must be acknowledged by both Chinese policymakers and their foreign counterparts.

China’s world view in the Xi Jinping Era: Where do Japan, Russia and the USA fit?

“…While the translation of this next phrase is under debate (Jakobson, 2016: 220), Xi (2014) added: ‘in the final analysis [or ultimately], it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia’.…”

China’s “Asia Dream”

“…Xi (2014a) didn’t just criticize the alliance system, but also employed an ‘Asia-for-Asians’ argument (also see Jakobson, 2016):In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation.Although Xi follows this argument with the declaration that ‘Asia is open to the world,’ Asia-for-Asians recalls the ‘sphere of influence’ logic that informed both the US’s Monroe Doctrine for the Americas and imperial Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—neither of which was very popular with its targeted countries.…”

“…My argument also takes ideas and domestic politics seriously, but has a more modest aim: rather than place recent Chinese foreign policy trends in the context of thousands of years of civilization, it will probe how Chinese foreign policy concepts and strategies are emerging out of current ideational debates in the PRC (see Jakobson, 2016; Johnston, 2013; Qin, 2006). As Qin Yaqing (2006: 13) puts it, the heart of Chinese foreign policy is not a realist security dilemma, but a critical constructivist ‘identity dilemma’: who is China, and how does it see the world?…”

“…Official Chinese discourse is often very vague, repetitious, and unwieldy. Although it is easy to dismiss official slogans ( tifa ) as propaganda, they are crucial in organizing thought and action in Chinese politics (Buckley, 2015; Jakobson, 2016; Johnston, 2013: 36). Rather than simply search the texts for ‘facts,’ it is imperative to actively interpret Chinese foreign policy documents by paying close attention to how existing official slogans are employed, how new ones emerge, and how the usage of both old and new slogans changes over time (Callahan, 2013; Swaine, 2012: 1–2; Xu and Du, 2015).…”

“…This article thus takes a hermeneutic approach that seeks to trace patterns of signification, and thus show ‘how the text can be understood in terms of the hidden content it discloses’ (Shapiro, 2013: 29–30). Indeed, this is how Chinese colleagues engage with official discourse: they look for patterns in order to add meaning to vague official declarations (see Jakobson, 2016; Xu and Du, 2015).…”