China’s “Asia Dream”

Abstract

Since Xi Jinping became leader in 2012, he has redirected Chinese foreign policy. This article examines the role of peripheral diplomacy in Xi’s emerging grand strategy. While it is popular to look to theories of the international system – offensive realism and liberal institutionalism – to explore this issue, this article follows constructivism to take seriously the role of ideas and domestic politics in foreign policy-making. Through an analysis of official and unofficial sources, it traces linkages between ideas, institutions, and behavior in Chinese foreign policy. In particular, it argues that Beijing is combining new ideas (China Dream, Asia Dream), new policies (comprehensive diplomacy and security), new institutions (AIIB) and new projects (BRI) to build what Xi calls the ‘community of shared destiny.’ The goal is to weave neighboring countries into a Sino-centric network of economic, political, cultural, and security relations. Beijing’s grand strategy thus is to re-constitute the regional order – and eventually global order – with new governance ideas, norms, and rules. Hence while the Asian region is an important focus of Chinese foreign policy, Beijing’s peripheral diplomacy is about more than win-win cooperation in the neighborhood. It also acts as the means to the much larger end of promoting China’s new vision of global governance. Theoretically, the article shows how ‘connectivity’ is more than an issue of the ‘hardware’ of physical infrastructure; it is also a ‘software’ issue of the connectivity of ideas, institutions, and behavior in diplomacy itself.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Global Model for an Evolving Approach to Sustainable Regional Development

“…The initiative has already attracted an additional US $8 trillion to facilitate infrastructural development across BRI countries, particularly in Asia. In late 2017, China also enshrined BRI into its Communist Party constitution to seek further international acceptance [50,51]. Chinese scholars argue that BRI is not only limited to infrastructural development; it will also generate policy and cultural dialogues among nations.…”

La Nueva Ruta de la Seda y la diplomacia internacional de negocios

“…Otro planteamiento enfatiza la combinación de nuevas ideas como el Sueño Chino, nuevas políticas de diplomacia y seguridad integral, nuevas instituciones, como por ejemplo el Banco de Infraestructura Asiática, y nuevos proyectos para construir lo que el presidente Xi denomina la "comunidad de destino compartido" (Callahan, 2016). En esta misma línea también se busca la manera en que China defina su identidad en relación a Estados Unidos y a otras potencias; por lo tanto, la estrategia detrás de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda es un asunto de la propia autodefinición de China (Larson, 2015).…”

Will Trump make China great again? The belt and road initiative and international order

“…And yet, while the official plans for the BRI rarely mention the United States, as Callahan notes, the western superpower 'haunts China's aspirations as a ghost that is both attractive (China likewise wants to be the global hegemonic power) and repellent (China insists that it will be a benevolently superior global power)'. 61 Notably, Xi's Davos speech came not long after Donald Trump's inauguration as president of the United States, and Trump himself was not present at either the World Economic Forum or the Belt and Road Forum. Though the Trump administration has been perceived by many as unpredictable, many spotted a clear contrast between Xi's keen leadership of capitalist development and a United States perceived as pursuing a new inward-looking and protectionist direction, more keen to demand than to lead.…”

“…73 The vision document and the rhetoric surrounding it go to considerable lengths to emphasize that although this is a Chinese initiative, it represents 'a common aspiration of all countries along their routes'. 74 Over the In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.…”

“…19 He understands the BRI as contributing to a redirection of Chinese foreign policy under way since Xi became leader of the Chinese party state in 2012, which combines new ideas (such as the 'Chinese dream' and the 'Asia dream'), new policies (such as 'comprehensive diplomacy and security') and new institutions (such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank: AIIB) to build what Xi calls a 'community of shared destiny' (gongtong mingyunti), and which Callahan shows to be Sinocentric. 20 Xi has explicitly stated that Asian cooperation must expand from the mutual benefit that has long been promoted by Beijing to encompass in addition 'shared beliefs and norms of conduct for the whole region'. 21 Such shared beliefs include commonly repeated principles such as mutual respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, equality and win-win, but also traditional Chinese ideas of a hierarchical regional structure with parallels in the historical 'tributary system'.…”