Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents

Zhong, Chongyi; Yang, Hui; Chun, Wang

doi:10.1155/2020/1636294

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…Moreover, [26], [27] and [28] proposes the variation of evolutionary stability strategy when the population of the evolutionary game is limited (i.e., the total number of players in the game is certain, the phenomenon of birth and death will occur) based on bounded rationality. The research also provides new ideas and research directions for the attackdefense security of wireless sensor networks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Optimal Decision Method for Intrusion Detection System in Wireless Sensor Networks With Enhanced Cooperation Mechanism

Xia

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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When it comes to selecting an optimal defense strategy for an intrusion detection system of a wireless sensor network, such challenges as those brought about by the diversification of the attack methods and the expanded database of the attack patterns have to be dealt with. To overcome those challenges, this paper combines realistic bounded rationality with the incomplete information of the attack-defense players by employing evolutionary game theory as a tool. Firstly, an attack-defense evolutionary game model considering three types of population, in which attackers are subdivided by the source of the threat into external attackers and selfish nodes, is proposed. The sets of player types and the game strategies in our model can be extended from 2× 2 to n× m × l. The sensitivity of the evolutionary population to similar strategies, which reflects the efficiency change in the multi-agent learning process, is depicted by a replicator dynamic equation especially optimized for this purpose by the introduction of an enhanced cooperation mechanism. In essence, an optimal defense strategy selection algorithm is provided by calculating the evolutionary stable equilibrium and a description of the evolutionary trajectory of the players over time is obtained. Moderate security and proactive defense in the form of support decisions have been provided by our method for wireless sensor networks. Experimental results have verified the validity of our method. Moreover, the optimized algorithm has solved the problem that an excessively large database of attack patterns affects the speed of switching to the optimal defense decision strategy and the learning efficiency of the evolutionary game replicator dynamic mechanism is not fast enough.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Optimal Decision Method for Intrusion Detection System in Wireless Sensor Networks With Enhanced Cooperation Mechanism

Xia

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

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“…So far, research on games of public goods have mainly focused on: theoretical analyses of market competitions based on Evolutionary Game between two or three, or even four groups [8,9], the innovation of synergetic mechanism based on three-group Evolutionary Game, and the mechanism coexistence or supply chain mechanism [10][11][12][13][14]. Yang, Yu, Yang, and Song et al did a large amount of research on the equilibrium of population game [15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22]. Taking a multi-player repeated game in eBay online bidding as an example, Jin and Yu studied information asymmetry, reputation effect, and cooperation balance [23]; Laclaua and Tomala considered repeated games with public deterministic monitoring, compact action sets, and pure strategies [24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

Simo

Yang

et al. 2021

Mathematics

Self Cite

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Based on a tripartite game model among suppliers of public goods, consumers, and the government, a tripartite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the evolution mechanism of which suppliers supply at low prices, consumers purchase, and the government provides incentives, and to establish the dynamics system of a repeated game. The equilibrium points of the evolutionary game are solved, and among them, the equilibrium points are found to satisfy the parameter conditions of ESS. The numerical simulation is employed to verify the impact of penalty coefficients and discount factors on the stability of strategies, which are adopted by the three players in a tripartite repeated game on public goods, and scenario analyses are conducted. The research results of this paper could provide a reference for the government, suppliers, and consumers to make rapid decisions, who are in the supply chain of public goods, especially quasi-public goods, such as coal, water, electricity, and gas, and help them to obtain stable incomes and then ensure the stable operation of the market.

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A new class of generalized Nash-population games via variational inequalities and fixed points

Zhan,

Li,

Huang

2024

Positivity

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Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents

Cited by 4 publications

References 10 publications

An Optimal Decision Method for Intrusion Detection System in Wireless Sensor Networks With Enhanced Cooperation Mechanism

An Optimal Decision Method for Intrusion Detection System in Wireless Sensor Networks With Enhanced Cooperation Mechanism

Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

A new class of generalized Nash-population games via variational inequalities and fixed points

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