A new class of generalized Nash-population games via variational inequalities and fixed points

Zhan, Yue-tian; Li, Xue-song; Huang, Nan-jing

doi:10.1007/s11117-024-01080-1

Positivity

2024

DOI: 10.1007/s11117-024-01080-1

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A new class of generalized Nash-population games via variational inequalities and fixed points

Yue-tian Zhan,

Xue-song Li,

Nan-jing Huang

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A new class of generalized Nash-population games via variational inequalities and fixed points

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References 36 publications

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