Reference Points and Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

We propose a theory of democratic backsliding where citizens' retrospective assessment of an incumbent politician depends on expectations that are endogenous to the incumbent's behaviour. We show that democratic backsliding can occur even when most citizens and most politicians intrinsically value democracy. By challenging norms of democracy, an incumbent can lower citizens' expectations; by not doubling down on this challenge, he can then beat this lowered standard. As a result, gradual backsliding can actually enhance an incumbent's popular support not despite but because of citizens' opposition to backsliding. This mechanism can only arise when citizens are uncertain enough about incumbents' preferences (e.g. owing to programmatically weak parties). Mass polarization, instead, can reduce the occurrence of backsliding while simultaneously increasing its severity.

How to study democratic backsliding

“…Moreover, rational (authoritarian‐leaning) elites can manipulate what citizens view as the status quo to grab power. Grillo and Prato (2023) show that if an extreme politician with antidemocratic inclinations wins office but then does not act as undemocratically as citizens expected, prodemocracy voters will offer support, ironically, because the incumbent is ostensibly more democratic than anticipated. The politician wins office and can violate laws, norms, and/or ideals or take power‐consolidating actions, but not so much that it will lead to an electoral loss.…”

“…This includes opposition to compromise across parties, supporting more extreme positions on public policy, and evaluating the performance of public officials based on their partisan affiliations rather than their actions (Druckman et al, 2024;Levendusky, 2023). These attitudes, in turn, provide leeway to elites to exploit citizens' partisan blinders and take undemocratic actions (e.g., Grillo & Prato, 2023). 29 Distinct from polarization is politicization, an inconsistently employed term.…”

Bandwagons in costly elections: The role of loss aversion

“…Acharya and Grillo (2019) study the tendency to re-elect a leader considering the canonical crisis bargaining model where loss-averse voters evaluate material outcomes relative to an endogenous reference point. In a recent paper, Grillo and Prato (2021) show that reference dependence enables an incumbent politician to challenge norms of democracy and still increase his popular support. Given citizens' aversion to democratic backsliding, challenging democratic norms lowers citizens' expectations about the incumbent's behaviour.…”

Democracy by Deterrence: Norms, Constitutions, and Electoral Tilting

“…Our approach expands the growing literature on democratic backsliding in the United States and abroad. Although the failure of party leaders to sustain cooperative norms figures prominently in empirical accounts of democratic erosion, recent formal‐theoretic work concentrates mainly on failures of vertical accountability between politicians and citizens (Buisseret and Van Weelden 2020; Graham and Svolik 2020; Grillo and Prato 2020; Luo and Przeworski 2020; Nalepa, Vanberg, and Chiopris 2021). By instead examining strategic dynamics between party elites, we show how the prospect of future retaliation by the opposition party shapes the incumbent party's decision about engaging in mutual restraint.…”