Democracy by Deterrence: Norms, Constitutions, and Electoral Tilting

Abstract

In contemporary democracies, backsliding typically occurs through legal machinations. Self-enforcing democracy requires that political parties refrain from exploiting legal opportunities to tilt electoral rules. Using a formal model, we argue that informal norms of mutual forbearance and formal constitutional rules are fundamentally intertwined via a logic of deterrence. By circumscribing how far each party can legally bend the rules, legal bounds create reversion points if mutual forbearance collapses. If legal bounds are symmetric between parties, they deter electoral tilting by making credible each party's threat to punish transgressions by the other. If legal bounds become sufficiently asymmetric, however, the foundations for forbearance crumble. Asymmetries emerge when some groups (a) are more vulnerable than others to legally permissible electoral distortions and (b) favored and disfavored groups sort heavily into parties. We apply this mechanism to explain gerrymandering and voting rights in the United States in the post-Civil Rights era.

Misperceptions about out-partisans’ democratic values may erode democracy

“…These rules entail core democratic characteristics, including free elections, protections of basic rights, and restraints on the abuse of power 2,5,8 . Partisan adherence to these rules is buoyed by a logic of mutual deterrence, with each side recognizing that any violation committed by their side can be used to justify the same or worse actions by competing parties 9 .…”

Backsliding among indicators of democratic stability relevant to public health: Risks in OECD nations

“…Here, less stable democracies may have incentives for further restriction of public goods for certain groups to concentrate benefits among core supporters, along with tactics to oppress and demobilize pushback against constrained access to these public goods (González, 2020; Lerman & Weaver, 2014; Trounstine, 2008, 2018; Weaver & Prowse, 2020). Tactics of oppression may include heavy or militarized policing (González, 2020); voting restrictions (Helmke et al, 2022); use or promotion of violence by state and nonstate actors (Bartels, 2020; Vark, 2021); or limiting aspects of procedural justice (Hemrajani, 2022; Weaver & Prowse, 2020).…”

On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare

“…While there is a growing literature on tacit cooperation among political rivals (e.g., Harrington 1992; Helmke et al 2021; Przeworski 1991), our paper is most closely related to those that study the effects of checks and balances on such cooperation (e.g., Dixit et al 2000; Invernizzi and Ting 2020; Stephenson 2003). Closest to the current paper is De Figueiredo’s (2002: 326) analysis of veto power on tacit cooperation, which considers a setting in which each faction that controls at least one institution can veto changes to the status quo.…”