Reditos Y Peligros Electorales Del Gasto Publico En La Argentina

Nazareno, Marcelo; Stokes, Susan C.; Brusco, Valeria

doi:10.2307/4151101

Cited by 34 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…I also run controls in the previous models to account for structural arguments that claim social-spending levels are related to socioeconomic development (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008;Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007;Melo and Pereira 2013;Calvo and Murillo 2004;Nazareno, Stokes, and Brusco 2006;Stokes 2007;Weitz-Shapiro 2012). I analyze whether there is any relationship between a district's average GDP per capita, the rate of national economic growth, and the poverty level in the province in a given year (using data from unsatisfied basic needs).…”

Section: Other Hypotheses In the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Competition and Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces

González

2017

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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What is the effect of political competition on subnational social spending? Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original budget panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 and 2009, the study finds that social spending increases the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office. It also finds that other arguments in the literature are relevant in explaining variations on types of spending, such as partisan fragmentation in the districts. The article discusses these findings for the Argentine provinces and explores their implications with regard to the debates on the effects of electoral competition and the design of social policies, especially in developing countries and federal democracies.

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Section: Other Hypotheses In the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Competition and Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces

González

2017

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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“…As mentioned in the introduction, part of the reason we know so little about this issue is because it is extremely difficult to collect systematic and reliable data on patronage. In contexts with weak or no civil service systems, some scholars have used different "proxies" such as the number of public sector employees (Calvo and Murillo 2004), number of temporary employees (Kemahlioglu 2006; or spending in personnel (Gordin 2002;Keefer 2005;Nazareno et al 2006;Remmer 2007) in order to study the electoral returns to patronage. However, even in the absence of civil service rules, a high number of public sector jobs (or high spending) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of patronage.…”

Section: Patronage Jobs and Political Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Working for the Machine: Patronage Jobs and Political Services in Argentina

Oliveros¹

2021

comp polit

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Conventional wisdom posits that patronage jobs are distributed to supporters in exchange for political services. But why would public employees comply with the agreement and provide political services after receiving the job? Departing from existing explanations, I argue that patronage employees engage in political activities because their jobs are tied to their patrons’ political survival. Supporters’ jobs will be maintained by the incumbent, but not by the opposition. Supporters, then, have incentives to help the incumbent, which makes their original commitment to provide political services a credible one. Using survey experiments embedded in a survey of 1,200 Argentine public employees, I show that patronage employees are involved in political activities and that they believe their jobs are tied to the political success of the incumbent.

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“…Debido a lo anterior, las consecuencias electorales del clientelismo y el patronazgo no son evidentes, si bien algunas investigaciones intentan estudiar el éxito electoral de las maquinarias clientelares. Por ejemplo, Stokes, Nazareno & Brusco (2006) miden los efectos del gasto en personal en los municipios argentinos sobre el desempeño electoral de las autoridades locales, y concluyen que un mayor gasto impacta nula o negativamente sobre el desempeño electoral. Calvo & Murillo (2008) han hallado que el aumento del empleo público en las provincias argentinas tiene efectos disímiles dependiendo de la militancia política del gobernador provincial.…”

Section: • 87unclassified

“…Gordin (2006) lo hace con el gasto en personal ministerial para comparar las causas del patronazgo en Argentina y Perú. Stokes, Nazareno & Brusco (2006) estudian el gasto en patronazgo en Argentina enfocándose en las causas y efectos en la varianza del gasto en personal de los gobiernos locales en proporción al gasto total anual. Y Remmer (2007) investiga el clientelismo en las provincias argentinas, usando el gasto en personal como variable dependiente.…”

Section: Justificación De Los Indicadores De Patronazgounclassified

Causas y efectos del patronazgo en municipios de Chile, 2008-2012

Mimica

Navia

2018

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Resumen En este artículo se analiza la presencia de vínculos clientelares y patronazgo en Chile como método de movilización electoral. Para ello se han estudiado las 345 comunas de dicho país entre 2008 y 2012. Con datos de gasto en personal y de empleo municipal, se han evaluado las causas del patronazgo y sus efectos en la participación y desempeño electoral. De ese modo se ha concluido que los alcaldes de la Unión Demócrata Independiente (udi) tienen una mayor tasa de gasto en personal municipal, que los municipios controlados por el Partido Por la Democracia (ppd) tienen las mayores tasas de empleo municipal y que el empleo municipal se utiliza como estrategia de movilización electoral.

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Reditos Y Peligros Electorales Del Gasto Publico En La Argentina

Cited by 34 publications

References 18 publications

Electoral Competition and Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces

Electoral Competition and Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces

Working for the Machine: Patronage Jobs and Political Services in Argentina

Causas y efectos del patronazgo en municipios de Chile, 2008-2012

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