2003
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455269
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Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform

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Cited by 45 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…In addition, among the 1 − e α proportion of initial losers, a such a reallocation. For a fuller discussion, see Jain and Mukand (2003) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 4 This could be, for example, the cost of reorienting the bureaucratic and administrative set-up to channel government expenditure towards sector M instead of the traditional sector A.…”
Section: The Economic Structure: Reform and Wagesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…In addition, among the 1 − e α proportion of initial losers, a such a reallocation. For a fuller discussion, see Jain and Mukand (2003) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 4 This could be, for example, the cost of reorienting the bureaucratic and administrative set-up to channel government expenditure towards sector M instead of the traditional sector A.…”
Section: The Economic Structure: Reform and Wagesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At each stage, based on the outcome of the reform so far, the government in power has the option to discontinue any further reform. Governments also have the ability to tax winners to compensate losers (as in Jain and Mukand, 2003). The most crucial element of our framework is that we endogenize both the government's decision on the continuation of reforms and on redistribution, through a political equilibrium involving the winners and losers at each stage.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, in political-economy models of economic reform it is often assumed that, if there is compensation, then all losers are compensated (see, e.g., Dewatripont and Roland, 1997;Claussen, 2002;Jain and Mukand, 2003). Although there is -as already mentioned -empirical support for wide compensation, 5 such an assumption may seem theoretically inconsistent with the modeling that such papers are based on.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For further discussion and examples of the role of uncertainty in the political economy of a reform, see Rodrik (1996) and Tommasi and Velasco (1995). A formal model of uncertainty and the adoption of economic reform was developed by Jain and Mukand (2003). Related time inconsistency problems were discussed by Dixit and Londregan (1996).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%