Majority voting leads to unanimity

Asheim, Geir B.; Claussen, Carl Andreas; Nilssen, Tore

doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0042-5

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 20 publications

(15 reference statements)

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“…in particular that all receivers receive the same compensation. Asheim et al (2006) show that, in a class of situations such as that in this model, the winners would have to compensate all losers, rather than trying to 'buy off' just enough losers to create a majority. 11 The budget-balance condition simply requires that, subject to the non-regressivity requirement, the maximal amount v collectable in taxes from the winners must be no less than the amount r redistributed to the losers.…”

Section: Observationmentioning

confidence: 87%

Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection

Jain¹

2017

WIDER Working Paper

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We conduct an incentive-theoretical analysis of political economy considerations in the design of social protection programmes in developing countries to accompany economic reforms. We focus on two aspects of social protection-the provision of redistribution and retrainingthat arguably characterize many reform packages. We analyse the interaction of compensatory redistribution and retraining programmes, and demonstrate that the provision of redistributive programmes might distort incentives for individuals to undertake worker retraining. This disincentive effect can be large enough to politically derail the passage of even those reform policies that are expected to increase output and to benefit a majority of the population. Conversely, it may be possible for an economic reform to win political support in the absence of compensatory redistribution. Thus we suggest that a 'political failure' may occur due to the complex interaction between the political and economic incentives created by these programmes.

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Section: Observationmentioning

confidence: 87%

Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection

Jain¹

2017

WIDER Working Paper

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State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform

Jain

Majumdar

2016

International Review of Economics & Finance

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Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform

Jain

Majumdar

Mukand

2014

Journal of Development Economics

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This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms in developing countries. First, we demonstrate that economic reforms that are proceeding successfully may run into a political impasse, with the reform's initial success having a negative impact on its political sustainability. Second, we demonstrate that greater state capacity to make compensatory transfers to those adversely affected by reform, need not always help the political sustainability of reform, but can also hinder it. Finally, we argue that in ethnically divided societies, economic reform may be completed not despite ethnic conflict, but because of it.

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Majority voting leads to unanimity

Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection

Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection

State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform

Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform

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