Redistribution, Pork and Elections

Abstract

Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on "wedge" issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically-based patronage or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide-the-dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right-wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left-wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right-wing parties should have an advantage over left-wing ones in majoritarian systems.

Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? U.S. Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget

“…Moreover, the use of senators per capita in spending regressions that use longitudinal data and state fixed effects do not isolate the role of small-state 43 They show that malapportionment only matters in some special circumstances such as supermajority rules, Senate proposal power, and non-targetability of expenditure to electoral districts. 44 See for example Huber and Ting (2009). WHY DO SMALL STATES RECEIVE MORE FEDERAL MONEY?…”

The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation

“…While the mechanism we uncover is novel, the existence of a tension between candidates' preferences and their ability to implement certain policies is documented elsewhere (Besley and Coate, 1997;Harstad, 2010;Volden and Wiseman, 2007;Christiansen, 2013;Huber and Ting, 2013). 7 Within this literature, the closest paper to ours is Huber and Ting (2013). It primarily focuses on when people "cross over" party lines in their voting.…”

“…More generally, the idea that pork distribution in the U.S. can be very unequal between parties is supported by little empirical evidence. 9 Furthermore, in Huber and Ting (2013), coordination could benefit either the party of the rich or the party of the poor. That is, the rich may vote for the party of the poor and high taxes to ensure they are not left out of the governing coalition.…”

When Do the Rich Vote Less Than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality across the World

“…The wealthy, for instance, may value public goods such as national security and infrastructure (Lizzeri and Persico ). In addition, redistribution may be politically salient even where bureaucratic capacity is low if the rich and the poor share common attributes—such as ethnic identity or region—that allow policy makers to cheaply offer group‐specific and non‐excludable benefits based upon these attributes (Fernandez and Levy ; Huber and Ting ). Finally, formal institutions affect how voters' preferences for redistribution are translated into party platforms and policy (Persson and Tabellini ).…”