Redirecting national parliaments: Setting priorities for involvement in EU affairs

Wilde, Pieter de; Raunio, Tapio

doi:10.1057/cep.2015.28

Cited by 29 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…Our research sheds new theoretical and empirical light on the political economy of EU parliamentary behavior (e.g., De Wilde and Raunio 2018;Hallerberg et al 2018;Closa and Maatsch 2014), and the economic roots of the 'responsiveness vs. responsibility tension' EU national parliamentarians face (Laffan 2014). Furthermore, the results qualify the discussion of the 'losers' of EU integration and how these fight back during stressful times (Auel and Höing 2014;O'Brennan and Raunio 2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 57%

Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union

Genovese

Schneider

2020

Rev Int Organ

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The handling of the 2008 financial crisis has reinforced the conviction that the European Union (EU) is undemocratic and that member states are forced to delegate overwhelming power to a supranational technocracy. However, European countries have engaged with this alleged power drift differently, with only a few member states demanding more parliamentary scrutiny of EU institutions. This article develops a political economy explanation for why only some states have enforced mechanisms to monitor the EU more closely. Our theory focuses on the role of the crisis and the impact of fiscal autonomy in countries outside and inside currency arrangements such as the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We argue that, in the aftermath of a severe economic shock, member states outside the EMU possess more monetary and fiscal resources to handle the crisis. These would then demand oversight of EU decision-making if their fiscal sustainability depends on the Union. By contrast, Eurozone states that need policy changes cannot address the crisis independently or initiate reforms to scrutinize the EU. Hence, we argue that during the heated moments of severe economic downturns, parliaments in Eurozone countries discuss supranational supervision rarely. As these legislatures have nevertheless to give in to the popular demand for EU control, they express support for more EU supervision in the infrequent times of debate. We provide evidence for our theory with a cross-national analysis of EU oversight institutions, and a new original dataset of parliamentary debates during the Eurozone crisis. Our findings highlight the political consequences that financial nosedives have across the diverse membership of a supranational organization.

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confidence: 57%

Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union

Genovese

Schneider

2020

Rev Int Organ

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“…We began with de Wilde and Raunio's (2015) normative statement that parliamentary debate is most needed and relevant for the public in core state policies and regarding European Council activities. Against this standard, our arguments and evidence are, in principle, optimistic.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When and why do we observe parliamentary debates about the policies of the European Union (EU)? De Wilde and Raunio (2015) make the normative argument that parliamentary debate is most needed in the EU’s salient core state policies—the policies that have drawn the European Council ever more into the details of policy-making and dominated public controversy on European integration post-Maastricht (Bickerton et al., 2015; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). In these areas, debates are of greatest relevance for interested audiences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is parliamentary attention to the EU strongest when it is needed the most? National parliaments and the selective debate of EU policies

Winzen

Ruiter

Rocabert

2018

European Union Politics

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When do parliaments debate European Union policies? Normative arguments suggest that debates enhance government accountability. Others warn of government bias, declining debate near elections, and parties avoiding Eurosceptic publics. Our conclusions are more differentiated. We argue that rank-and-file parliamentarians rather than leaders initiate debates. Political incentives guide their debate selection towards salient policies in the countries in which voters care most. However, where the motivation Eurosceptic publics provide and institutions facilitating rank-and-file agenda-setting are lacking, EU law-making and European Council priorities will raise little parliamentary attention. Analysis of original data, using a Bayesian and multilevel framework, lends credibility to our views. Claims of a government bias, election effects, or trends towards more debate are unlikely to hold in all countries.

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“…On the other hand, international politics often happens at venues which are less transparent to the public. For instance, most events at NATO or EU forums in Brussels are not covered by the media as much as national politics, nor scrutinized as carefully by national parliaments as domestic policy making (Auel, Eisele, and Kinski 2018;de Wilde and Raunio 2018).…”

Section: Conspiratorial Thinking and Foreign Policy Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conspiratorial thinking and foreign policy views: evidence from Central Europe

Onderčo

Stoeckel

2020

Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

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Foreign policy analysts assume that conspiratorial thinking is linked to citizens' foreign policy views and in particular to a preference among citizens for an alignment with Russia rather than the West. Empirical studies on the relationship between conspiratorial thinking and citizens' foreign policy views are, however, lacking, despite a growing general academic interest in its origins and consequences. Our analysis breaks new ground by empirically evaluating the relationship between conspiratorial thinking and foreign policy preferences based on ISSP survey data for Slovakia. We find that conspiratorial thinking decreases the extent to which citizens prefer their country to be aligned with the West. The effect of conspiratorial thinking is substantively meaningful and on par with other predictors of foreign policy views.

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Redirecting national parliaments: Setting priorities for involvement in EU affairs

Cited by 29 publications

References 50 publications

Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union

Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union

Is parliamentary attention to the EU strongest when it is needed the most? National parliaments and the selective debate of EU policies

Conspiratorial thinking and foreign policy views: evidence from Central Europe

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