Recovering Understanding

Zagzebski, Linda

doi:10.1093/0195128923.003.0015

Cited by 219 publications

(84 citation statements)

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“…According to Zagzebski ([2001]), one of the most striking differences between knowledge and understanding is that while understanding is transparent, knowledge is not. On her view, understanding is fundamentally a matter of grasping how various pieces of information relate to one another; it is a matter of making connections among them, of seeing how they hang together.…”

Section: Zagzebski's Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But that understanding is a kind of knowledge is something that-so far at least-has rarely been doubted by those working in the field. 2 That makes it all the more striking that virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about the nature of understanding-including Catherine Elgin ([1996], [2004]), Linda Zagzebski ([2001]), and Jonathan Kvanvig ([2003])-has come to the conclusion that understanding is not a species of knowledge. 3 They variously claim, for example, that understanding is immune to Gettier problems whereas knowledge is not, that understanding is transparent whereas knowledge is not, and that understanding is possible even in the absence of truth, whereas this is an impossibility for knowledge.…”

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Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Grimm¹

2006

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

287

198

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Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of ''grasping'' that seems to be characteristic of understanding differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge.

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Section: Zagzebski's Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Grimm¹

2006

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

287

198

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“…(Thus, as Lewens (2015: 255-56) points out, an evolutionary biologist will help us to understand 7 Leaving the poor death-watch beetle out of things for the moment, although I believe this case is worth thinking carefully about in its own right. 8 For other contemporary philosophers who tie understanding to structure, see Zagzebski (2001), Grimm (2011Grimm ( , 2017, and Greco (2014). According to Julius Moravcsik (1979), this was also the view of the ancient Greeks, especially Plato.…”

Section: A General Framework For Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Study History? On Its Epistemic Benefits and Its Relation to the Sciences

Grimm¹

2017

Philosophy

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I try to return the focus of the philosophy of history to the nature of understanding, with a particular emphasis on Louis Mink's project of exploring how historical understanding compares to the understanding we find in the natural sciences. On the whole, I come to a conclusion that Mink almost certainly would not have liked: that the understanding offered by history has a very similar epistemic profile to the understanding offered by the sciences, a similarity that stems from the fact that both are concerned with grasping how the objects of their study are structured, or how the various elements of the things they study depend upon and relate to one another. At the same time, however, I claim that historical inquiry naturally puts us in a position to acquire further epistemic goods, including the old-fashioned epistemic good of wisdom, which is plausibly constituted by knowledge of how to live well. This is something the natural sciences cannot offer, and it is part of the reason why history is such an important form of inquiry. ***In an incisive essay published fifty years ago, Louis Mink (1966) argued that in order to appreciate what is distinctive about history as a discipline, we first need to clarify what is distinctive about the epistemology of history. In particular, he suggested, we first need to clarify how the sort of understanding offered by history differs from the understanding offered by the natural sciences. Only thus, Mink claimed, can we properly establish not just history's autonomy as a form of inquiry, but also its special importance.

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“…Ogni alternativa vagliata, da "comprensione" a "intelletto", è risultata inadeguata. Inoltre, il dibattito sull'"understanding" in epistemologia e in filosofia della scienza ha assunto ormai una fisionomia internazionale molto ben definita (si vedano, per l'epistemologia: Elgin, 2007Elgin, , 2009Kvanvig, 2003;Zagzebski, 2001; per la filosofia della scienza: de Regt, 2009de Regt, , 2015de Regt and Gijsbers, forthcoming;Mizrahi, 2012;Khalifa, 2011), cui non ha ancora fatto seguito una tradizione italiana condivisa sul modo in cui tradurre tale termine che sia in grado di richiamare il contesto di tale dibattito, come avviene invece con il termine inglese. della verosimiglianza di una teoria scientifica 4 ; 3) la concezione "problemsolving" (Kuhn, 1970;Laudan, 1977), secondo cui il progresso scientifico si verifica quando si verifica un incremento nel numero dei problemi che si è in grado di risolvere.…”

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Sulla concezione noetica del progresso scientifico

Sterpetti¹

2017

Paradigmi

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SOMMARIOLe principali concezioni del progresso scientifico sono tre: la concezione epistemica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento della conoscenza; la concezione semantica, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento delle verità; la concezione problem-solving, secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando si verifica un incremento del numero dei problemi che si è in grado di risolvere. La concezione epistemica è ritenuta la più compatibile con una prospettiva realista. Di recente, Dellsén ha proposto la concezione "noetica", secondo cui il progresso si verifica quando vi è un incremento dell'understanding di un fenomeno da parte degli scienziati. Dellsén sostiene che la concezione noetica sia una concezione realista del progresso più adeguata di quella epistemica. Scopo di questo articolo è valutare se la concezione noetica sia più adeguata della concezione epistemica.PAROLE CHIAVE: concezione epistemica; concezione noetica; conoscenza; progresso scientifico; quasi-fattività; understanding. ON THE NOETIC ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS ABSTRACTThere are three main accounts of scientific progress: the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. The epistemic account is considered to be the account of progress more compatible with a realist stance. Recently, Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress than the epistemic one. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic account is more adequate than the epistemic one.

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Recovering Understanding

Cited by 219 publications

References 10 publications

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Why Study History? On Its Epistemic Benefits and Its Relation to the Sciences

Sulla concezione noetica del progresso scientifico

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