Recouping wage underpayment: increasingly less likely?

Abstract

Corporate collapses in Australia have provided stark evidence that employees do not always secure their employment entitlements, despite having a legal right to do so. There has been an implicit assumption in the Australian industrial relations system that employer evasion of employee entitlements is rare. However, our detailed examination of enforcement within the Australian federal industrial relations system shows, for the first time, that despite awards, industrial agreements, union presence and an official enforcement agency, correct payment of entitlements has always been problematic. This paper examines inspection strategy between 1904 and 1995 and makes two points. The first is that changes in strategy have reduced the probability of detection. The second is that shifts towards individual contracts, lower union density, and increased precarious employment have decreased the likelihood of employees' ability to recover monies owed.

Campaign strategies to develop regulatory mechanisms: Protecting Australian garment homeworkers

“…Second, issues in enforcement of regulations continue to challenge legislative effectiveness where chains of subcontracting exist. Successful enforcement requires there to be a real risk that non-compliance will be detected and punished such as to make non-compliance unprofitable for the offending employer (Hardy and Howe, 2009; Maconachie and Goodwin, 2006). However, the system still tends to rely on individual complaints.…”

Transforming the Inspection Blitz: Targeted Campaigns, Enforcement and the Ombudsman

“…These were conducted with a strategic view to variables potentially affecting compliance such as organisational size, whether rural or metropolitan, unionisation status, compliance history and whether a new business or new industrial instrument was involved (Maconachie and Goodwin 2006). Such inspections efficiently allocated limited resources as well as providing the deterrent effect of an inspector 'doing the rounds'.…”

“…In terms of detection tools and strategies, the federal minimum labour standards' enforcement agency has traditionally relied on regular, routine physical inspections of workplaces and records to ensure compliance with regulations (Maconachie and Goodwin 2006). These were conducted with a strategic view to variables potentially affecting compliance such as organisational size, whether rural or metropolitan, unionisation status, compliance history and whether a new business or new industrial instrument was involved (Maconachie and Goodwin 2006).…”

The implications of de‐collectivist industrial relations laws and associated developments for worker health and safety in Australia, 1996–2007

“…This sample probably overstates the proportion of proactive visits by inspectors, but research confirmed an increasing focus on targeted visits rather than relying on complaints, incidents or 'walking the beat'-the norm for most Australian OHS inspectorates until the late 1990s. The trend to proactive enforcement reflects developments in other countries (Johnstone, 2004) and distinguishes OHS inspectorates from IR inspectorates where enforcement activity remains complaint based (Maconachie and Goodwin, 2006). In contrast, submissions to the Comcare Review (Morris, 2008) alleged that Comcare inspectors did not adopt a proactive approach.…”